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The Need for a GATT Doctrine of Locus
Standi: Why the United States Cannot
Stand the European Community's
Banana Import Regime
Rodrigo Bustamante
On July 1, 1993, the European Community ("EC") restruc-
tured its import system for bananas by passing Regulation EEC
No. 404/93 ("EEC 404/93").1 Premised on Protocol 5 of the Lome
Agreement of 1989,2 EEC 404/93 grants preferential treatment
to bananas entering the EC from a coalition of its African, Carib-
bean, and Pacific ("ACP") former colonies while discriminating
against bananas originating in non-ACP countries (third coun-
try bananas).3 Various countries 4 have challenged the validity
1. Council Regulation 404/93 of 13 February 1993 on the Common Organ-
ization of the Market in Bananas, 1993 O.J. (L 47) 1. The EC Council continues
to amend EEC 404/93 aggressively based on circumstances it considers may
adversely affect the beneficiary countries from the African-Caribbean-Pacific
("ACP") coalition. See, e.g., Commission Regulation 2358/95, 1995 O.J. (L 241)
5 (amending EEC 404/93 by allocating an additional quantity of imports to the
established banana tariff quota during the fourth quarter of 1995 as a result of
three tropical storms).
2. African, Caribbean and Pacific States-European Economic Community:
Final Act, Minutes and Fourth ACP-EEC Convention of Lome, December 15,
1989, 29 I.L.M. 783 [hereinafter 1989 Lome Convention]. Under Protocol 5 of
this agreement, known as the "banana protocol," the EC and its former colonies
belonging to the ACP coalition agreed to "determine the measures to be imple-
mented so as to improve the conditions for the production and marketing of
bananas.. . [To enable the ACP states... to become more competitive both on
their traditional markets and on the markets of the Community." Id. at 897.
Through the 1989 Lome Agreement, and its three predecessors, the EC secured
an institutional framework for the development of EEC 404/93 as member
states voiced their support for a proposed joint coalition with a view towards
achieving the objectives of the banana protocol. Id. at 898.
3. 404/93, supra note 1, arts. 1, 15, 18.
4. See First Submission of the United States of America in European
Communities - Regime for the Importation, Sale and Distribution of Bananas,
1996 WL 397092 (G.A.T.T.), 7, 11 (July 9, 1996) [hereinafter Brief for the
U.S.]. The Regulation has affected several Latin American banana-producing
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of this "discriminatory" import regime on different institutional
grounds, including violations of the General Agreement on Tar-
iffs and Trade ("GATT) 5 and infringement of EC member states'
sovereignty. 6 In 1993, and again in 1994, several Latin Ameri-
can countries claimed disruption of market and competitive re-
lationships before a GATT panel, specifically arguing that EEC
404/93 ran afoul of GATT Articles I, II, III, XI, and XIII. 7 In
1994, Germany attacked the legality of EEC 404/93 on a differ-
ent institutional front, under the Treaty on the European Com-
munity.8 Despite these efforts to dismantle or modify the EC
banana regime, and in defiance of overwhelming criticism by
economists and trade specialists,9 the EC's import mechanism
survived.
nations (i.e. Colombia, Ecuador, Venezuela, Costa Rica, Guatemala, Honduras,
Mexico, Panama, and Nicaragua) that have traditionally relied on the EC as
their primary export recipient. Id.
5. See generally Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round
of Multilateral Trade Negotiations, Apr. 15, 1994, THE RESULTS OF THE URU-
GUAY ROUND OF MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS: THE LEGAL TExrs, GATT
Sales No. 1994-4 (1994), at 2 [hereinafter GATT]. The results of the Uruguay
Round of negotiations included the creation of the World Trade Organization
(WTO), the signing of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994 (GATT
1994), and several other plurilateral agreements. GATT 1994 incorporates the
original GATT 1947 giving it full effect in consideration of side agreements that
limit or expand its original language.
6. See Case C-280/93, Federal Republic of Germany v. Council, E.C.R. I-
4973, [1994] 34 I.L.M. 154 (1995) [hereinafter Germany v. EU Council]; see also
Inger Osterdahl, Bananas and Other Current Issues in the External Trade Law
of the European Union, 6 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 473 (1997) (stating Germany's
claim against the EU Commission for acting in contravention of its authority
vested through the Treaty on the European Community).
7. GATT Dispute Settlement Panel Report on the European Economic
Community - Import Regime for Bananas, Jan. 18, 1994, 34 I.L.M. 177, 185
(1995) [hereinafter 1994 Panel Report]. For a detailed discussion of Articles I,
II, III, XI, and XIII, see infra notes 78-79, 108. See also infra note 49 and ac-
companying text.
8. See Germany v. EU Council, supra note 6, at 160-61.
9. See Banana Policy Gone Mad, J. COM., Aug. 7, 1996, at 7A (reiterating
that the current import scheme represents an ill-advised financial arrangement
for the European Union as it "costs European consumers about $2 billion a year
[but shows] hardly any increase in the consumer prices reaching the banana-
exporting nations for whom it is intended"). Cf Banana Economies, J. COM.,
Sept. 11, 1996, at 6A (ascertaining that the EU's policy only benefits the Carib-
bean Banana Exporters' Association as they retain the heavy premium Euro-
pean consumers pay while the growers for whom the policy was intended do not
reap the same benefits). "The WTO should simply throw out the policy for vio-
lation of Economics 101." Id.
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Staunch supporters of the regime, namely the United King-
dom, France, Spain, and the beneficiary ACP nations, 10 how-
ever, currently face perhaps the most daunting legal challenge
against this protectionist device. As the world's most influential
trade player, the United States has assumed the position of lead
claimant in constructing a joint legal attack with co-claimants
Ecuador, Honduras, Guatemala, and Mexico." Ironically, the
United States is not a substantial banana-producing nation and
yet it stands in the middle of this dispute demanding the EC
comply with its obligations under several sections of the GATT
and other Uruguay Round agreements. 12 The United States ar-
gues that American banana marketing firms have suffered par-
ticular injuries as a result of the EC banana import regime
because they are unable to obtain the market share they enjoyed
prior to the regime. 13
Although the GATT currently does not recognize any princi-
pled doctrine of standing, it should adopt such a doctrine to en-
able it to determine which parties have an appropriate stake or
interest in a dispute to properly seek relief under GATT. This
Note examines established principles of locus standi from which
a practical and appropriate doctrine of standing may be devel-
oped for the benefit of WTO dispute settlement administration.
Taking the ongoing banana claim as the operating model, part I
of this Note utilizes the antecedents to the current dispute to
trace the path of the claimants' particular motivations, claims
and separable legal arguments. Part II focuses on the main
GATT dispute settlement provisions, Article XXIII and the
DSU, 1 4 which provide parties with the framework to bring their
claims before the WTO and to ascertain their rights and
obligations.
10. See Brief for the U.S., supra note 4, 15-17 (contrasting the treat-
ment EC member states respectively afforded banana imports prior to EEC
404/93, which underscored the tendency of France, Spain and the United King-
dom to impose tariffs and non-tariff measures individually on Latin American
bananas to allow domestic and ACP bananas to more amply serve the demand
of their markets).
11. Agriculture: EU Commission Approves New Rules on Banana Quota,
Geographical Names, 13 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA), No. 36, at 449 (Mar. 13, 1996).
12. See discussion infra Part I.E.1.
13. See discussion infra Part I.D.
14. See Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement
of Disputes, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World
Trade Organization, Annex 2, THE RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND OF MULTI-
LATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS: THE LEGAL TExTs, GATT Sales No. 1994-4
(1994) [hereinafter DSU].
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Part HI examines the concept of standing as a universal
tenet in the administration of dispute settlement. This section
includes an overview of the American15 and international doc-
trines of standing. This overview will enable the reader to dis-
cern the underlying motivations for such a doctrine in
adjudicatory schemes and forecast the potential pitfalls the
WTO faces in continuing to settle disputes without such a doc-
trine. Part IV applies the above-stated standing models to the
American presence in the Banana Case in order to scrutinize its
legal propriety. This section will examine whether under Ameri-
can and/or international principles of standing as articulated by
the International Court of Justice in the Barcelona Traction
case 16 the United States or any state should be able to invoke a
right to assert the interests of its nationals under diplomatic
protection in these particular circumstances.
Finally, Part V synthesizes the principles used in both the
American and international models of standing that should fuel
the development of a viable and flexible GATT doctrine of stand-
ing. This Note concludes that if GATT adopted a standing doc-
trine, the United States would lack standing to assert its claim
for relief in the Banana Case because it lacks the necessary
stake or interest in the controversy. Such a conclusion would
comport with established principles of standing in conjunction
with the political and economic premises on which GATT was
founded.
I. BACKGROUND
A. THE EC MARKET PRIOR TO EEC 404/93
Since 1988, the EC has boasted the title of "world's largest
importer of bananas," credited with nearly 40% of the global ba-
nana market.17 In 1991, the cumulative volume of fresh ba-
nanas in the EC neared 3.63 million tons, of which Latin
American countries produced two-thirds of the total.' 8 In 1992,
15. American jurists have fashioned perhaps the most principled, and well-
documented, doctrine of standing of any legal system. Its application to the
facts of this case serves only to illuminate the potential virtues and vices that
may derive from such a doctrine in the GATT dispute settlement system.
16. See discussion infra Part IIIA-B.; Barcelona Traction, Light and Power
Co., Ltd. (Belg. v. Spain), 1970 I.C.J. 3 (Judgment of Feb. 5) [hereinafter Barce-
lona Traction].
17. 1994 Panel Report, supra note 7, at 183.
18. Id. Besides the 3.63 million tons the EC imported, the United States
and Japan enjoyed the other considerable import markets of 2.9 million and 0.8
million tons respectively. Id.
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the total supply of bananas in the EC market approximated 3.76
million tons of bananas, of which Latin American countries pro-
vided 2.4 million tons and ACP countries provided around 0.69
million tons. 19
Before allowing entry of this large volume of bananas, how-
ever, customs personnel of individual EC member states sub-
jected such bananas to their import regulations. Despite a
GATT tariff commitment of 20% ad valorem, 20 EC member
states differed in their regulation of banana imports. 21 At one
extreme, France, Spain and the United Kingdom (UK) subjected
Latin American bananas to substantial tariff and non-tariff bar-
riers primarily to permit ACP and domestic bananas to meet
their market demand.22 On the other end, "Germany [alone]
granted duty-free treatment for imports of bananas within a
tariff-rate quota established at the level of estimated consump-
tion, resulting in free entry for bananas from all sources."23 Two
other groups composed the middle ground of the EC's spectrum
of banana import regulation. Italy, Greece and Portugal em-
ployed some non-tariff barriers, yet still permitted significant
19. Id. In 1992, EC domestic suppliers accounted for 19% of the bananas
consumed in the Community, while ACP countries supplied 16%, and Latin
American or other third country sources provided 65% of the total supply. Prior
to EEC 404193, the primary Latin American suppliers to the EC were Ecuador,
Colombia, Costa Rica, Panama, Honduras, Nicaragua, and Guatemala. Id.; see
also Brief for the U.S., supra note 4, 10-11.
20. An ad valorem tariff is a tax levied as a percentage of the value of the
imported goods. For example, if a product were imported at a price of $100, then
a 20% ad valorem tariff would require a $20 duty before the import may be
allowed entry. See JOHN J. JACKSON ET AL., LEGAL PROBLEMS OF INT'L Eco-
NOMIC RELATIONS: CASES, MATERIALS AND TEXr 373-74 (3d ed. 1995).
21. See Brief for the U.S., supra note 4, 9 10-14. Between 1963 and July
1, 1993, the EC preserved a collective tariff rate on bananas of 20% ad valorem,
but informed the GATT contracting parties on October 19, 1993 of its intention
to renegotiate the 1963 concession consistent with GATT Article XXVIII, para-
graph 5. See 1994 Panel Report, supra note 7, at 184. Through GATT Article
II, GATT members are able to exchange and verify tariff commitments that
publicly convey the maximum tariff level a country may impose on a specific
good. See JACKSON, supra note 20, at 384-85. In the case of the EC's collective
ad valorem tariff on bananas, individual member states were permitted to ad-
minister any tariff level they preferred so long as it did not exceed the specified
20% ad valorem maximum. Thus, individual EC states could differ in their
treatment of banana imports with respect to the assessment of tariffs on
bananas.
22. See Brief for the U.S., supra note 4, T 17. At various times, Spain,
France, and the United Kingdom administered tariffs and varying forms of
quantitative restrictions, licensing requirements, import bans, or prohibitive
taxes against third country banana imports. Id.
23. Id. 16. Germany absorbed more than one-third of the EC's total im-
ports. Id.
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entry of imports originating in Latin America. 24 Another contin-
gent, comprised of Belgium, Denmark, Luxembourg, the Nether-
lands, and Ireland, allowed practically unobstructed passage of
bananas into their markets irrespective of their place of origin.25
These countries simply adhered to the established GATT bind-
ing of 20% ad valorem, allowing imports from Latin America to
participate in supply and demand dynamics by growing with
consumption.26
B. THE LomE CONVENTION OF 1989 AND =H GENEsIs OF EEC
404/93
From October 12, 1988 through November 27, 1989, repre-
sentatives from the twelve European Economic Community
member states27 and the sixty-nine ACP countries negotiated a
comprehensive multilateral scheme to improve trade, develop-
ment, and regional coordination efforts known as the Fourth
ACP-EEC Convention of Lome. 2s Under Protocol 5, the EC and
ACP states agreed to "improv[e] the conditions under which the
ACP States' bananas are produced and marketed and [to] con-
tinu[e] the advantages enjoyed by traditional suppliers in ac-
cordance with ... Article I of [this] Protocol."29 The "Banana
Protocol" was not a novel idea in the Fourth Lome Convention;
the three prior Lome Conventions, beginning in 1975, also pro-
vided for efforts to improve or preserve advantages enjoyed by
producers, marketers, and traditional suppliers of ACP banana-
producing countries. 30 The parties further stipulated that if the
interested ACP states decided to establish a joint organization to
fulfill the objectives of the Protocol, then the EC "shall" endorse
such an organization and give due consideration to any request
submitted. 31 This type of language was consistent with the
Common Agricultural Policy ("CAP"), which the EC progres-
24. Id. 15.
25. Id. 16.
26. Id.
27. In 1989 it was still formally the EEC, but it later changed to the Euro-
pean Community (EC). At that point, only twelve states were part of the EEC,
a figure that increased to fifteen by 1996.
28. See 1989 Lome Convention, supra note 2, at 783 (outlining innovative
provisions not included in Lome Conventions I, II, or III, such as a support
mechanism for structural adjustment of economies of ACP countries and ar-
rangements to address the general problem of debt).
29. See id. at 897.
30. See, e.g., Protocol 4 on Bananas of the Third ACP-EEC Convention of
Lome, Dec. 8, 1984, 1986 O.J. (L 86) 160.
31. See 1989 Lome Convention, supra note 2, at 897.
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sively formulated for the benefit of member states and in consid-
eration of its international agreements, such as the 1989 Lome
Convention.32
With such a broad declaration of support for a joint organi-
zation formed by ACP countries, the EC Commission fulfilled
the prophecy of EEC 404/93 on February 13, 1993.33 As origi-
nally adopted, EEC 404/93 imposed a tariff quota 34 of two mil-
lion tons per year on banana imports. 35 The tariff quota,
however, was applied according to whether the imports
originated in ACP or non-ACP states, prompting a set of specific
import categories.3 6
The first of these categories, "traditional imports from ACP
nations," referred to the amount of banana imports originating
in ACP states that had traditionally exported bananas to the
Community."37 EEC 404/93 exempted this category of imports
32. Id.
33. See supra notes 31-32 and accompanying text (highlighting the EC's
manifest willingness to adopt measures to fully effectuate a structured import
scheme for bananas); see also EEC 404/93, supra note 1, para. 16 (asserting
inter alia that a chief objective of EEC 404/93 is "to ensure a satisfactory mar-
keting of bananas produced within the Community and of products originating
in the ACP states within the framework of the Lome Convention Agreements").
34. Tariff quotas provide a different tariff rate based on the amount of im-
ports that have already entered the country. For instance, a tariff quota may be
structured to allow the first 10 million tons of bananas to enter the territory at
10% ad valorem, but imports in excess of the 10 million ton quota would receive
a higher 30% ad valorem tariff. See JACKSON, supra note 20, at 374.
35. See Germany v. EU Council, supra note 6, at 157. The EC Commission
amended the stated figure of two million tons as a result of the Uruguay Round,
which placed the quota level at 2.2 million tons. See Brief for the U.S., supra
note 4, 20. The EC Commission has amended, supplemented, and imple-
mented many of the original provisions of EEC 404/93 via regulations formu-
lated through its banana management committee procedures. Id. 18. Note
that the figures presented herein as part of EEC 404/93 may or may not be the
actual percentages or amounts stated in the original promulgation, but are in
some form the legitimate result of an amendment, decision, or order which
proper authorities duly made. To minimize confusion, reference to such amend-
ments, decisions, or orders have been omitted and will be presented as the sub-
stance of EEC 404/93, with the exception of the modifications effectuated by the
"Framework Agreement on Bananas" ("BFA"). See infra Part I.D for a discus-
sion of BFA.
36. See Germany v. EU Council, supra note 6, at 157. Technically, refer-
ences to "third countries" in EEC 404/93 encompass all exporters of bananas to
the EC so long as they are neither ACP or EC states. For purposes of this Note,
all references to "third countries" refer to the relevant Latin American coun-
tries involved in some stage of the Banana Case. Latin American bananas are
also commonly referred to as "dollar bananas."
37. See EEC 404/93, supra note 1, tit. iv, art. 15; see also Germany v. EU
Council, supra note 6, at 157; Brief for the U.S., supra note 4, 21.
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from any duties so long as the import levels did not exceed
857,700 tons.3S Second, EEC 404/93 defined "non-traditional
imports from ACP states" as exports from ACP states not consid-
ered to have been traditional exporters of bananas to the EC, as
well as any imports from traditional ACP suppliers exceeding
the 857,700 ton limit.39 The Regulation subjected bananas en-
tering the EC under the "non-traditional" category to the two-
million ton tariff quota, which if otherwise exceeded would trig-
ger a specific tariff of 750 ecus per ton.40 Third, "imports from
non-ACP countries," namely third countries or Latin American
states, faced markedly different treatment. Any third country
bananas entering under the specified two-million ton quota were
to elicit a duty of 100 ecus per ton, while any amount entering
over such quota would evoke a more substantial levy of 850 ecus
per ton.41
In designing EEC 404/93, the EC Commission not only pro-
vided a tariff quota, but also fashioned a licensing scheme. Of
course, whenever a tariff quota emerges, the more salient ques-
tions regarding its operation revolve around the licensing
scheme for importers. EEC 40493 requires the distribution of
banana import licenses under the tariff quota among three cate-
gories of eligible "operators," A, B and C, each of whom possesses
a particular share of the previous two-million ton cumulative
tariff quota limit.42 Originally, Category A licenses granted
66.5% (1.33 million) of the cumulative two-million ton quota pool
to "operators who marketed third country or non-traditional
38. EEC 404/93, supra note 1, 1 18 (stating that "traditional imports of
bananas from the ACP fall outside the duty-free tariff quota as part of tradi-
tional quantities which takes account of specific investments already made
under programmes for increasing production"). The stated amount of 857,000
tons curiously exceeded the maximum quantity of bananas imported from ACP
countries by 24% in any year through 1992. See Germany v. EU Council, supra
note 6, at 157.
39. See Germany v. EU Council, supra note 6, at 158.
40. See id. The category of "non-traditional imports from ACP states" pri-
marily targets ACP countries that begin an export market after the passage of
EEC 404/93. If such nations were to export, however, a certain quantity of ba-
nanas under the 2 million ton cap for duty-free ACP imports, then these non-
traditional exporters also would receive duty-free treatment in spite of their
non-traditional exporter status. Id. For an example, see supra note 34 and ac-
companying text. The term "ecu(s)" refers to "European currency units," which
act as the EC's sole unit or account enabling it to draw up the Community's
budget and facilitate financial interaction with trade partners such as the ACP
coalition. EuRoPEAN COMMUNITY-CoNMUssIoN, THE Ecu 5-7 (1987).
41. See EEC 404/93, supra note 1, art. 18; see also Germany v. EU Council,
supra note 6, at 158.
42. See Germany v. EU Council, supra note 6, at 158.
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ACP bananas."43 Category B licenses allowed "operators who
marketed Community and/or traditional ACP bananas" to im-
port 30% (600,000) of the total quota. 44 Finally, 3.5% (77,000) of
the quota was reserved as Category C licenses for "operators es-
tablished in the Community who started marketing bananas
other than Community or traditional ACP bananas from
1992." 45 In order for operators to obtain a license under either
Category A or B, the license administrator must assess the aver-
age amount of the specific type of bananas (i.e. third country,
traditional or non-traditional) that the operator had sold in the
three most recent years for which data was available. 46
C. To CHANGE OR NOT TO CHANGE: GATT LEGAL ATrACKS ON
EEC 404/93
Latin American banana exporters did not wait for EEC 404/
93 to take effect before invoking the GATT dispute settlement
apparatus. They requested consultations with the EC to discuss
individual state import regimes structured to satisfy Protocol 5
of the 1989 Lome Convention. 47 The first challenge to the then-
unorganized protectionist mechanism came on June 12, 1992,
when Colombia, Costa Rica, Guatemala, Nicaragua and Vene-
zuela requested consultations.48 After these consultations failed
to produce a mutually satisfactory resolution, the complainants
requested the creation of a panel to investigate the matter.49 On
May 19, 1993, the Panel submitted its report which found sev-
43. See EEC 404/93, supra note 1, tit. IV, art. 19; Germany v. EU Council,
supra note 6, at 158.
44. See Germany v. EU Council, supra note 6, at 158.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 158-59.
47. See supra note 31 and accompanying text; see also 1994 Panel Report,
supra note 7, at 181. Both the GATT and the DSU include a provision of"con-
sultations" that allows parties to enter into negotiations before they petition the
WTO's intervention. See GATT, supra note 5, art. XXII; DSU, supra note 14,
art. 4.
48. See GATT Dispute Settlement Panel Report on the European Economic
Community - Members States' Import Regime for Bananas, June 3, 1993,
available in LEXIS, Itrade Library, Gttwto file 11, *1 [hereinafter 1993 Panel
Report].
49. See id. at *2. The complainants claimed that Belgium, France, Greece,
Ireland, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, and the United King-
dom violated GATT Articles I, II, XI, and XIII, as well as Part IV of the General
Agreement. Colombia submitted its own set of claims alleging violations of
GATT Articles I, III, VIII, XI, XXXVI, and XXXVII; in the alternative, Colombia
alleged that even if the EC states' actions were consistent with GATT provi-
sions, complainants were still entitled to relief because of the resulting nullifi-
cation and impairment of the benefits accrued under the GATT. Id. at *21-*22.
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eral of the individual EC states' treatment of Latin American
bananas to be protectionist and inconsistent with numerous
GATT provisions.50 Notwithstanding these findings, complain-
ants received no relief from the individual countries as the EC
collectively blocked adoption of the GATT report under pre-Uru-
guay Round dispute settlement procedures. 51 The EC was able
to block the adoption of the report only because its presentation
occurred prior to the recently incorporated "Understanding of
Dispute Settlement Procedures and Regulations." 52 Former
GATT dispute settlement procedures afforded losing parties in
disputes the right to block adoption of a report by simply voting
their opposition at the Council meeting even if the rest of the
contracting parties voted to adopt the report.53
Concomitant with the blockage of the 1993 Panel Report,
the same complainants had already begun their efforts to avert
the creation of the actual banana import regime as discussed on
December 17, 1992 at an EC Ministerial meeting.5 4 On Febru-
ary 19, 1993, Colombia, Costa Rica, Guatemala, Nicaragua, and
Venezuela lodged a second request for consultations with the EC
under the same GATT Article XXII:2 regarding the recently en-
acted EEC 404/93. 55 Again, the parties held consultations on
the matter to no avail. Upon the claimants' request, the GATT
Council formed a panel to hear the dispute and report its find-
ings. The Panel found various components of the EC banana im-
port system violative of GATT obligations: first, the panel held
the 30% allocation of the tariff rate quota to Category B license
operators on the basis of three-year marketings of EC or ACP
bananas was inconsistent with GATTs MFN and national treat-
ment obligations as defined in Articles I and III respectively;
second, it found the duties levied on third country bananas in
contravention of tariff binding obligations of Article II; finally,
the panel deemed the preferential tariffs accorded to ACP ba-
nanas violative of Article 1.56
50. See generally id.
51. See Brief for the U.S., supra note 4, 1.
52. See generally DSU, supra note 14, at 404-33.
53. Id.
54. See 1994 Panel Report, supra note 7, at 181.
55. Id. The EC Council of Ministers rejected the first request for consulta-
tions reasoning that the decision taken on December 17, 1992 was not of a for-
mal character so as to classify it as a "measure" under GATT Articles XXII:1 or
XXIII:I, but rather was merely a policy-setting discussion about the future of
the banana sector. Id.; see also supra note 47 and accompanying text.
56. See 1994 Panel Report, supra note 7, at 188-92. The Panel further pos-
ited a strict interpretation of Article XXIV:8(b) and thus failed to find the 1989
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D. THE STRATEGY OF APPEASEMENT: THE FRAMEWORK
AGREEMENT ON BANANA IMPORTS ("BFA")
Although the second panel's findings jeopardized the GATT
validity of EEC 404/93 in the wake of both the first panel's find-
ings and the EC's refusal to adopt its report, the EC found a way
to avert a recalcitrant second report veto. The EC persuaded all
of the complainants, except Guatemala, to abandon their multi-
lateral efforts to secure an EC banana import regime consistent
with GATT guidelines in exchange for country-specific shares of
the total EC tariff-quota. 57 The agreement, called the "Frame-
work Agreement on Banana Imports" ("BFA"), was signed on
March 29, 1994.58 Generally, the BFA fixed the basic tariff
quota at 2.1 and 2.2 million tons for 1994 and 1995 respec-
tively.59 Further, the Agreement distributed shares of the
global quota among the relevant Latin American countries as
follows: Costa Rica (23.4%); Colombia (21%); Nicaragua (3%);
Venezuela (2%); Dominican Republic and other ACP countries
constituting the "non-traditional" category (90,000 tons); and
Others (46.32%) for 1994 and (46.51%) for 1995.60
Several features of the BFA made it especially appealing to
the acquiescent Latin American countries. First, in case of force
majeure, countries were allowed to fulfill their specific quotas
with bananas from other BFA countries.61 Second, in the event
a country notified the EC that it would be unable to fulfill its
quota for that year, the Community would reallocate that coun-
try's undersupply among the other BFA countries based on their
Lome Convention to be valid grounds for an exemption to the EC's most-fa-
vored-nation obligations. Id.; see also Brief for U.S., supra note 4, 1 3. As a
consequence of the second panel's report, the EC and ACP states applied to the
GATT Council for a waiver of the Lome Convention of 1989, which it granted in
December of 1994. Jack J. Chen, Going Bananas: How the WTO Can Heal the
Split in the Global Banana Trade Dispute, 63 FoRDHAM L. REv. 1283, 1301
(1995). The waiver provides the applicants with the right to derogate their obli-
gations of GATT Article I:l as required by the relevant provisions of the Lome
Convention of 1989 until February 29, 2000, when the Convention expires. Id.
at 1303.
57. Germany v. EU Council, supra note 6, at 155; see also Costa Rica-
Colombia-Dominican Republic-European Community-Nicaragua-Venezuela:
Framework Agreement on Banana Imports, Mar. 29, 1994, 34 I.L.M. 1 (1995)
[hereinafter BFA].
58. BFA, supra note 57, at 1.
59. Id.
60. Id. The allocations among the BFA countries account for more than
half of the total tariff quota.
61. Id. at 2.
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percentage shares of the global quota.62 The BFA also aimed to
manage any shift in quotas through the use of export certificates
by BFA signatories. Under the BFA, Colombia, Nicaragua, and
Costa Rica were authorized to issue export certificates for 70% of
their exports to the EC.
The issuance of such export certificates, however, may carry
some additional burdens depending on the operator category
ascribed to license recipients. The BFA established that if a sig-
natory issues an export certificate to a Category A or C operator,
the certificate serves only as a prerequisite to the authorization
of import licenses by the EC to such operators. 63 Category B
operators, which historically marketed EC and/or traditional
ACP bananas, may receive the export certificate free of any fur-
ther import licensing requirement. 64 The BFA countries' ability
to deliver export certificates to other countries has a special sig-
nificance for U.S. companies. The American companies at issue
not only handle the export of bananas from Latin American
countries, but also serve as the operators or importers in Eu-
rope. As Category A operators, such American companies are
required to obtain the import license in addition to the export
certificate, an additional demand not required of B operators.
65
The BFA catalyzed the U.S. efforts towards reform of the
EC banana import regime. Ironically, although the EC suc-
ceeded in defusing the Latin American challenge by persuading
four of the claimants to desist from pursuing the adoption of the
GATT panel report, it now faces the U.S.-led challenge which is
plausibly more onerous than any previous attack. 66
62. Id. The shortfall provision also allows BFA countries to transfer their
percentage shares to other Framework countries. Nicaragua exercised this op-
tion by transferring all of its 3% share to Colombia for both 1995 and 1996.
Venezuela likewise transferred to Colombia 70% of its 2% share for 1995 and
30% of it for 1996. See Brief for the U.S., supra note 4, 25.
63. Brief for the U.S., supra note 4, 1 59.
64. See BFA, supra note 57, at 2. The United States, in its brief to the
WTO panel, complains of discrimination by the EC in its distribution of 30% of
the global quota to Category B operators when there is allegedly no basis for
such an allocation in light of past marketings of traditional ACP and/or EC
bananas during any rolling-three year reference period. See Brief for the U.S.,
supra note 4, IT 30, 113. It further alleges that the EC has only exacerbated its
discriminatory measures by exempting companies receiving such B licenses
from obtaining the additional license authorization by the EC in addition to the
export certificate requirement pursuant to the Framework Agreement. See id.
914.
65. Brief for the U.S., supra note 4, 1 59.
66. See id. 1 3.
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E. THE PEARL HARBOR OF THE BANANA WAR: WHY THE
UNITED STATES BECAME INVOLVED
Until September 2, 1994, the United States had refrained
from entering the banana war. At that time, Chiquita Brands
International, Inc. and Hawaii Banana Industry Association,
two major American-owned multinational enterprises, filed a pe-
tition under Section 30167 of the 1974 Trade Act with the United
States Trade Representative (USTR).68 The petitioning entities
exhorted the U.S. government to probe the discriminatory prac-
tices the EC, Colombia, Costa Rica, Venezuela, and Nicaragua
were undertaking with respect to trade in bananas.69 On Octo-
ber 17, 1994, the USTR responded to the petition by commenc-
ing an investigation of both EEC 404/93 and the BFA under
section 302(a) of the Trade Act of 1974.70 This section "autho-
rizes the USTR to investigate acts, policies and practices of a
foreign country that are unreasonable or discriminatory and
burden or restrict U.S. commerce as defined by Section 301 of
the Trade Act."71 Addressing separately the actions of each
party subject to investigation, the USTR requested each country
to withdraw from or re-negotiate the BFA. 72 Upon receiving
their refusal, the USTR initiated its probe of each country's in-
volvement in the BFA.73
67. Section 301 of the U.S. Trade Act of 1974 authorizes the executive
branch to retaliate against practices of another country that are considered "un-
fair" in trade and commerce, thereby adversely affecting U.S. interests and
those of its nationals. United States nationals may petition the government to
initiate investigatory proceedings of a country's trade practices under Section
301. Many foreign countries have strongly criticized Section 301 because they
feel it empowers the United States with unfettered latitude for retaliation.
Such opposition may be warranted, because the President, through the United
States Trade Representative Office, may retaliate, even where there is no show-
ing that the alleged offense violates any international agreement. Additionally,
U.S. officials may impose these sanctions without any regard to GATT/WTO
authorities or to U.S. international obligations. See JACKSON, supra note 20, at
815-20 (introducing Section 301 and controversies surrounding it).
68. Proposed Determinations and Action Pursuant to Section 301: Euro-
pean Community Banana Import Regime; United States Request for Public
Comment, 34 I.L.M. 350, 350 (1995).
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. See Initiation of Section 302 Investigations Regarding Policies and
Practices of the Governments of Colombia and Costa Rica Concerning the Ex-
portation of Bananas to the European Union; United States Requests for Public
Comment, 34 I.L.M. 350, 350 (1995).
73. Id.
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Concurrent with this inquiry, the U.S. government decided
to study the possibilities of bringing a claim under the World
Trade Organization. 74 In October 1995, the United States, as a
signatory to the GATT and member of the WTO, filed a com-
plaint before the WTO along with Mexico, Guatemala, 75 and
Honduras. Ecuador joined the complaint in February of 1996.76
1. The American Legal Arguments for Relief Under Trade in
Goods
The United States has advanced a bi-level attack on the EC
banana import regime. The first part of its challenge focuses on
provisions of the GATT. Coverage under the GATT is limited to
transactions involving goods and excludes services. Under the
rubric of trade in goods, the United States first cites GATT Arti-
cle I:1 as a prohibition against the EC's duty free treatment of
non-traditional ACP bananas entering within the tariff quota
safe harbor, and its discrimination against below-quota third
country bananas which are subject to a 75 ecu per ton duty.77
Second, the United States rests its challenge on Article XIII,
which covers "non-discriminatory administration of quantita-
tive restrictions ("QRs')."78 Generally, Article XIII mandates
that a GATT member which justifiably employs tariff quotas
74. The American inquiry into the agreement between the EC and the BFA
countries, Venezuela, Costa Rica, Nicaragua, and Colombia, has tentatively
ended in a series of bilateral agreements with the respective countries to rene-
gotiate the BFA. Any efforts to comply with the agreements, however, will
probably lack any diligence until the panel of the subject dispute submits its
final report. Telephone Interview with Pam Waltzer, Partner, McDermott Will
& Emery, Washington, D.C., Counsel for Chiquita Banana, Inc. (Nov. 7, 1996).
75. Guatemala was the only claimant of those in the second dispute that
refused to abort its efforts to pursue legal action under GATT against EEC 404/
93 in exchange for a country-specific quota allocation. See supra note 57 and
accompanying text.
76. Agriculture: WTO Dispute Panel Begins Hearing on EU Banana Re-
gime Complaint by U.S., 13 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 36, at 1423 (Sept. 11,
1996).
77. See supra notes 37-41 and accompanying text (discussing the EC regu-
lations); Brief for the U.S., supra note 4, 64. The United States concedes that
the GATT Council waived the EC's MFN obligations with respect to certain
preferential treatment which the Lome Convention required. It maintains,
however, that the Convention only requires preferential treatment for tradi-
tional ACP bananas, not non-traditional ones. Id.; GATT, supra note 1, art. I
(requiring GATT members who provide certain trade preferential treatment to
other countries to unconditionally and immediately accord the same treatment
to other GATT members).
78. Brief for the U.S., supra note 4, 66-89. GATT Article XIII, 1 states:
"[n]o prohibition or restriction shall be applied by any contracting party on the
importation of any product of the territory of any other contracting party...
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may do so provided it does not administer the tariff quota
scheme in a discriminatory manner.79 It follows that Article
XIII applies Article I's critical MFN principle to the administra-
tion of quantitative restrictions. Within this general prohibi-
tion, the United States focuses on Article XIII:2, which compels
countries utilizing QRs to abide by the "equitable market access
distribution" principle.80 This component to Article XIII:2 obli-
gates GATT members who validly employ import restrictions to
"aim at a distribution of trade in such product approaching as
closely as possible the shares which [the Members] might be ex-
pected to obtain in the absence of such restrictions.""' Article
XIII:2(d) further permits countries that allocate a quota among
supplying countries to "seek agreement with respect to the allo-
cation of shares in the quota with all other contracting parties
having a substantial interest in supplying the product
concerned." 2
In its brief to the WTO, the United States asserts that the
EC's tariff quota, as modified by the BFA, offends the equitable
"market access distribution" principle.83 In support of its argu-
ment, the United States contrasts specific country market allo-
cations to BFA countries and the lack thereof to non-BFA
countries.8 4 For example, the United States cites the EC specific
quota allocation of 44,000 tons to Venezuela, a BFA party, in
spite of average imports from Venezuela to the EC of only 90
and 45 tons for the periods of 1989-1991 and 1990-1992 respec-
tively.8 - While such a seemingly incongruent quota allocation
occurred under the BFA, non-BFA countries such as Guatemala,
Ecuador, and Honduras, which collectively exported 716,535
tons to the EC between 1990 and 1992, received no country-spe-
cific quota.86 While the United States concedes that Article XIII
unless the importation of the like product of all third countries ... is similarly
prohibited or restricted." GATT, supra note 5, art. XIII, 1.
79. See Brief for the U.S., supra note 4, 67 (reiterating Article xIIrs
premise of non-discrimination in the administration of quantitative
restrictions).
80. See id. 1 69.
81. See GATT, supra note 5, art. XIII, 2.
82. Id. I 2(d) (emphasis added).
83. Brief for the U.S., supra note 4, 1 70.
84. Id. T 74.
85. Id.
86. Id. 75, tbl. 1. Although the provision for a country using QRs to enter
into an agreement with respect to quota allocation among supplying parties
provides certain leverage to interested parties, the provision clearly states that
such an agreement is available to supplying countries with a substantial inter-
est in the product concerned. See GATT, supra note 5, art. XIII, 2(d). The
1997]
MiN.w. J GLOBAL TRADE [Vol. 6:533
does not prevent a country from providing allocations to coun-
tries that do not meet the substantial interest criteria, it under-
scores that any quota allocations must conform with the
reasonable expectations that GATT members would have re-
garding their market shares in the absence of such import
restrictions.8 7
In addition, the United States complains that the BFA al-
lows for reallocation of shortfalls of banana exports among the
BFA signatories if they petition for it. The United States main-
tains that permitting two BFA countries to decide between
themselves to reallocate the shortfall is equally inconsistent
with the obligations of Article XIII, which instead would obligate
the EC to allocate any unmet country-specific quota on a non-
discriminatory basis among all historical suppliers.88 Whatever
the EC's actual motivation may be for the BFA, the United
States claims that Article XIII:2 proscribes the manner in which
the EC allocated market shares in its tariff quota scheme. It
specifically condemns the EC's disregard of the proportions of
the total quantity or value of the exports that BFA and non-BFA
GATT members supplied during previous representative
periods.8 9
relevant issue for this Note lies in whether the United States has such substan-
tial interest in the subject product to make it a proper party in petitioning the
EC to modify the BFA scheme pursuant to the principle of proportional market
access distribution. Chiquita Inc. has different operations throughout Latin
America. It has production operations in Colombia and Costa Rica (BFA coun-
tries) and also in Guatemala, Honduras, and Panama (non-BFA countries). It
also operates purchasing offices in Ecuador and Mexico, both non-BFA coun-
tries. In order of rank, the strongest production venues are: Panama, Costa
Rica, Honduras and Guatemala. Telephone Interview with Chiquita Banana,
Inc. (February 7, 1997). These facts crystallize the U.S.' objection to the BFA
shortfall reallocation provision because some of its major banana-producing and
distribution operations are excluded from a potential increase to their export
volumes. The injury Chiquita, Inc. alleges, through the U.S. government, fo-
cuses on this specific inability of the four complaining parties to reach higher
proportions of the tariff quota, where Chiquita, Inc. is present in some capacity.
The U.S. claim and request for relief on this issue, however, is identical to the
claim and injury alleged by non-BFA banana producing and exporting Latin
America countries. See discussion infra notes 159-60 and accompanying text.
87. Brief for the U.S., supra note 4, 75.
88. Id. 87-89.
89. See id. 1 69. In an incredulous tone, the United States challenged the
EC's preferential treatment of banana imports from some non-GATT members
whose highest export levels have never approximated the specific country quota
allocated them by the EC regime. To this end, the United States questioned the
legal basis in GATT of Protocol 5 of the 1989 Lome Convention in concert with
the BFA. The United States alleges that the effects of their concurrent opera-
tion not only provide ACP countries preferential treatment in trade in bananas,
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Finally, the United States vehemently attacks the EC's li-
censing scheme as unduly burdensome, complex, and inconsis-
tent with the WTO Licensing Agreement, GATT Articles I:1,
X:3, III:4, and the Trade Related Investment Measures Agree-
ment ("TRIMS").90 The United States juxtaposes licensing for
traditional ACP bananas with the "baffling" licensing complexi-
ties that are applied to imports from third countries.91 The
United States points to five distinct, but cumulative, steps that
create such a disparately cumbersome licensing process for im-
porters of third country bananas: (1) distribution of licenses
based on three operator categories (A, B, and C); (2) distribution
of licenses to A and B operators according to three activity func-
tions, which erode legitimate license eligibility; (3) export certifi-
cate requirements established pursuant to the BFA; (4) two-step
rounds to administer overbids on non-BFA countries; and (5)
distribution of additional hurricane licenses to EC and ACP pro-
ducers and distributors. 92 The United States claims that the EC
established this multi-layered licensing process to achieve spe-
cific Community policies such as: (1) keeping quota rents within
the Community through the general use of import licenses; (2)
providing business to EC-owned or controlled distribution com-
panies through the allocation of 30% of the global quota to Cate-
gory B operators; and (3) attempting to prevent a WTO
challenge to its entire regime through the BFA.93
2. The Alleged Effects of the EC Import Regime on American
Companies
Collectively, the United States argues that the EC banana
import regime has injured American banana marketing compa-
nies by undermining their ability to obtain the market share
they enjoyed prior to the regime. 94 As noted above, the United
States blames this diminution in market access on discrimina-
tory treatment of third country bananas, discriminatory applica-
tion of country-specific allocations, and the discriminatory
but also grants non-GATT members preferential treatment, while failing to ex-
tend similar treatment to certain GATT third countries that have larger export-
ing capacities. See id. 71.
90. See id. 92-134. The GATT and the Licensing Agreement seek to
insulate members from improper use of licensing schemes which may serve to
disadvantage certain importers to the benefit of domestic goods or license oper-
ators. See JACKSON, supra note 20, at 431.
91. See Brief for the U.S., supra note 4, 90.
92. Id. 927.
93. Id. 102.
94. See id. 9 147-50.
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allocation of 30% of the total quota to Category "B" operators. In
particular, the United States complains most indignantly about
the issuance of 30% of the third country tariff-rate quota
("TRQ") to B operators, who had scarcely any history of distrib-
uting or transporting non-ACP and non-EC bananas. It charac-
terizes the effects of such issuance as an incentive for importers
to purchase EC and/or traditional ACP bananas given that no
importers of such types of bananas have ever approached the
allocated percentage quota. 95 The United States extracts the
crux of its argument from the 1994 Banana Panel report, which
states that "B operator eligibility criteria [was] inconsistent with
GATT Articles I:1 and III:4, because they provide incentives to
purchase other origin bananas."96 The Panel further observed
that "operators wishing to increase their future share of ba-
nanas benefitting from the tariff quota would be required to in-
crease their current purchases of EEC or traditional ACP
bananas."97
In response to the U.S. assertion, the EC justifies granting
30% of the TRQ to Category B firms through its policy of "cross-
subsidization," which was the result of a "difficult political com-
promise in 1993."98 The EC explained that "cross-subsidization"
achieved valid Community policies "through issuing licenses to
import [third country] bananas to those who traded in Commu-
nity or ACP bananas, [in order to provide both] financial com-
pensation for the higher production costs of [EC and ACP]
bananas, [and] also act as an incentive for the market to become
more integrated, and to encourage operators to trade in both
"dollar" and EC/ACP fruit."99 Notwithstanding this purported
justification, the United States fears that the EC purposefully
planned such a system to siphon business away from American
companies and into EC-owned or controlled companies by en-
couraging such importers to purchase EC and/or traditional
ACP bananas. 100
95. See id. 112-14.
96. Id. 113.
97. Id.
98. Id. 30.
99. Id.
100. See Brief for the U.S., supra note 4, 113-15, 127; see also supra note
95 and accompanying text. Note that the arguments the United States made
with respect to inequitable administration of the EC's tariff quota or the BFA
reallocation shortfall provision do not differ at all from the interests of the Latin
American co-complainants. Both the United States and the Latin American
countries want to increase the tariff quota level corresponding to them, either
individually or as a collective entity.
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In sum, the United States presented an exhaustive array of
legal grounds on which the WTO's Dispute Settlement Body
("DSB") 10 may consider granting relief in terms of trade in
goods. Although the United States claims to have sustained in-
jury under both the GATT and the General Agreement on Trade
in Services ("GATS"), 10 2 this Note maintains that the United
States lacks standing only with respect to claims made under
the GATT, which solely covers transaction of goods. This Note
does not opine on the propriety of the DSB to consider granting
relief based on the U.S. arguments premised on the GATS, on
which the other prong to the American attack against the EC
banana regime rests. The field of trade in services is embryonic,
as is its foundational Services Code, which remains undeveloped
in interpretive substance. Considering the hypothesis of this
Note, the presence of the United States as a party in the Banana
Case remains puzzling because of its removed nature from the
production of the transacted goods, being a mere marketer
rather than a substantial producer of such goods. This distinc-
tion essentially disables the U.S. from properly asserting its
claim for restitution as a matter of right under GATT Article I
because it is not a logical recipient of such benefit.103
Before examining the U.S. and International Court of Jus-
tice's ("ICJ") doctrines of standing, which provide the analytical
framework to address the propriety of the American involve-
ment in the Banana Case, it is imperative to consider the ame-
nability of the GATT dispute settlement system to a doctrine of
standing. Mindful that both U.S. courts and the ICJ are strictly
adjudicatory in nature, and may operate in different climates
than the one in which the DSB functions, one must consider
whether the nature and mandate of the WTO's dispute settle-
ment apparatus lends itself to a standing requirement. To focus
this inquiry, it is necessary to examine the provisions in the
WTO Charter that empower panels to hear disputes, as well as
the purpose and nature of the dispute settlement process.
101. The 1994 Dispute Settlement Understanding provided for the creation
of this novel dispute settlement organ called the Dispute Settlement Body
("DSB"), which is essentially the WTO Council acting in its dispute settlement
role. See PIERRE PESCATORE ET AL., HANDBOOK OF WTO/GAT DISPuTE SE LE-
MENT 72 (1996).
102. General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS), Apr. 15, 1994, Mar-
rakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1B, THE
RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND OF MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS: THE
LEGAL TFxTs, GATT Sales No. 1994-4 (1994).
103. The distinction between a producer and marketer is analyzed in detail
infra Part IV.A.
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II. GATT/WTO DISPUTE SEITLEMENT LAW
A. ARTCLE XXIII AND THE 1994 UNDERSTANDING
During the Uruguay Round negotiations, the GATT con-
tracting parties agreed to create the World Trade Organization,
upon whom fell the responsibility of administering the dispute
settlement system.' 04 GATT dispute settlement procedures de-
lineate a system whereby members of the GATT and other WTO
agreements can seek to enforce the extensive rights and duties
the GATT/WTO imposes on them.' 05 Article XXIII, which
serves as the GATT's principal provision for dispute settlement,
states that:
[I]f any contracting party should consider that any benefit accruing to
it directly or indirectly under this Agreement is being nullified or im-
paired or that the attainment of any objective of the Agreement is be-
ing impeded as the result of(a) the failure of another contracting party
to carry out its obligations under this Agreement, or (b) the application
by another party of any measure, whether or not it conflicts with the
provisions of this Agreement, or (c) the existence of any other situation,
the contracting party, may with a view to the satisfactory adjustment
of the matter, make written representations or proposals to the other
contracting parties which it considers to be concerned. Any con-
tracting party thus approached shall give sympathetic consideration to
the representations or proposals made to it.106
To understand the scope of the dispute settlement mecha-
nism, one must accept the general premise on which GATT is
founded: "to constrain governments from imposing or continu-
ing a variety of measures which restrain or distort international
trade."10 7 Thus, the key to the effective functioning of the sys-
tem lies in preserving the presumed "balance" that parties reach
through negotiations of maximum tariff levels, which is the life-
blood of the General Agreement.108
104. See PEscATORE, supra note 101, at 12. The Agreement establishing the
World Trade Organization ("WTO") marked a new era in GATT history. It pri-
marily provided a common institutional framework for parties to GATT and
other agreements under the auspices of the WTO to advance their trade rela-
tions. Of particular importance to our discussion, the WTO serves as the forum
for trade negotiations and dispute settlement between parties to the Agree-
ments. Id.
105. See id. at 70-71.
106. GATT, supra note 5, art. XXII.
107. JACKSON, supra note 20, at 290.
108. Cf id. at 331 (discussing the incumbent duty of a party who has vio-
lated a GAIT provision in spite of circumstances that made the violation inevi-
table to compensate the parties affected by such a violation in order to restore
the "balance" of obligations or concessions). Generally, the GATT aims to con-
trol the protection countries afford to their domestic products through three
principles: Article rs Most-Favored-Nation ("MFN") treatment, Article HI's na-
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Article XXIII permits contracting parties, after having ex-
hausted consultations with each other, to request the formation
of a panel to hear the matter.'0 9 One or both parties may lodge
the request with the GATT Council, which is then obligated to
grant the request. 110 Neither the GATT Council nor the panel,
however, possess the means by which to evaluate a complain-
ant's stake in the dispute. Without a determination of whether
an interested GATT member has the appropriate stake to be a
proper party to a dispute, the WTO dispute settlement system
tional treatment, and Article XI's prohibition against quantitative restrictions
(QRs). See PESCATORE, supra note 101, at 18. The MFN principle obligates
each GATT member to treat other GATT parties at least as well as it treats any
other country with regard to imports or exports. Article I focuses on "border
measures" imposed on products before they pass through customs. See JACK-
SON supra note 20, at 298. On the other hand, the concept of national treatment
concerns internal taxation and regulatory measures. Article III aims to elimi-
nate internal border restrictions that may affect the sale, offering for sale,
purchase, transportation distribution or use of imports. To this end, this provi-
sion prohibits members from imposing on imports different internal taxes, in-
ternal charges, laws, regulations or other requirements from those it imposes
on domestic products. See id. at 299. Finally, Article XI, albeit with several
prominent exceptions, provides for the general elimination of QRs. Such a con-
ditional dictate embodies GATT's basic philosophy in respect of import re-
straints, which asserts that they should be in the form of maximum tariff levels
negotiated by GATT parties. See id. at 423. With these three principles per-
vading several of the General Agreement's provisions, the core of the GATT
rests in Article II where tariff negotiations have produced a schedule of tariff
concessions of all member states, on which the delicate "balance" of conditions
of competition is canvassed. Id. at 298. The interplay between these four arti-
cles seeks to create the highest degree of transparency in the actions countries
take to conduct trade with each other. Id.
109. See PESCATORE, supra note 101, at 72. A panel typically consists of
three international trade experts who have received the approval of the dispu-
tants. Under Article XXIII and the DSU, the GATT Council is required to es-
tablish a dispute panel if one contracting party alleges that another has
transgressed its obligations under the GATT. The panel considers the merits of
the case, formulates a report, and recommends the appropriate action to allevi-
ate the dispute. See JACKSON, supra note 20, at 327. Note that the basic out-
line of the dispute settlement process depicts the GATT Council's duties as
merely to find the panelists who are charged with evaluating the dispute and
formulating a report. The process is devoid of any principled basis for deter-
mining whether the party bringing the claim has a proper stake or interest in
the alleged controversy.
110. See JACKSON, supra note 20, at 341 (noting that Article 6.1 of the DSU
clearly sets out a complainant's right to have a panel established). The Con-
tracting Parties established the GATT Council in 1960. Since the parties tradi-
tionally met only once a year, they concluded that an entity was needed to
handle the large volume of issues that emerged in the interim. Thus, the GATT
Council along with several committees, which invited the participation of any
and all GATT members, assumed nearly all of the powers the members pos-
sessed. The Council generally meets monthly and requires consensus in its de-
cisions. See PESCATORE, supra note 101, at 12.
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faces the perils of an ill-crafted process for filing and accepting
complaints. Moreover, political and economic influences plague
the environment of the WTO, which improper parties may ex-
ploit to the detriment of fair dispute settlement administration.
Hence, these observations trigger valid concerns regarding the
lack of a principled doctrine of locus standi to determine
whether claimants have the requisite stake and should be enti-
tled to represent the injured interests in the adjudication of a
claim.
B. THE NATURE OF WTO DIsPUTE SEI rEMENT: A MORE
ADJUDICATORY CHARACTER
Through Article XXIII, the founding GATT parties adopted
a dispute settlement provision without answering basic ques-
tions about its character - should it be legalistic or prag-
matic?"' One group of GATT members, including the United
States, argues that the dispute settlement mechanism should
operate under a judicial model to "promote more precise deci-
sions on the merits of disputes and more effective implementa-
tion of decisions."112 Such a model perceives the General
Agreement as a "balance of concessions." 113 The notion of "bal-
ance of concessions" is premised on the ideal of reciprocity. Gen-
erally, a GATT country provides tariff concessions for goods that
other countries produce more efficiently. Conversely, the same
GATT country bargains to obtain a tariff concession for a prod-
uct that it produces more efficiently than the other countries.
The negotiating countries thus attempt to exchange tariff con-
cessions that are similar in value, which forges a balance and
creates defined commitments governed by the general obliga-
tions pervading GATT, such as the MFN and national treatment
obligations. 114 According to this characterization, the WTO as a
111. See PESCATORE, supra note 101, at 75 (addressing these two conflicting
models).
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. See JACKSON supra note 20, at 379-80, 383-84. A common problem with
tariff negotiations are "free-riders." GATT Article rs MFN obligation requires
that the most favorable treatment a GATT member affords to any country with
regards to a tariff or non-tariff benefit must be equally afforded to all GATT
members. This means that some GATT members who have not bargained for
some benefits may free-ride or enjoy them without having given any tariff con-
cessions in return. See id. Although the GATT principle of unconditional MFN
allows for members who have not bargained for such benefits to "free-ride" on
the coattails of other members' bargains, a country claiming violation of MFN is
limited by the language of Article I. Such language does not give rise to a claim
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dispute settlement organ seeks to restore the "balance of conces-
sions" when contracting parties upset the GATT's equilibrium
by obtaining compensation from the transgressors of the code of
conduct or allowing the adversely affected party to retaliate in
kind.115
Contrary to the legalistic model, pragmatists, such as the
EC and Japan, espouse a more flexible approach to dispute set-
tlement procedures. 116 The "pragmatic" or "antilegalistic"
model treats dispute settlement as a vehicle to nudge con-
tracting parties towards a mutually acceptable solution to any
dispute. 117 Unlike the legalistic model, the pragmatic model
does not approach the General Agreement as a code of conduct,
but rather relies on the collective commitment of the GATT par-
ties to enter into and maintain their agreements with each
other. 118 This sort of "good faith" approach seems to disfavor the
WTO's use of compulsory measures to remedy the breach of
GATT members' obligations.
Negotiators of the Uruguay Round, however, casted their
imprimatur on a more legalistic than pragmatic model for the
WTO dispute settlement system. 119 This assertion is supported
by the creation of an Appellate Body with the authority to re-
view panel decisions, and language in the DSU that all but elim-
by a certain category of free-riders. The DSB should recognize that GATT Arti-
cle I is not grounds for a claim for the restoration of benefits by a country which
does not produce the subject good or "like product" in its territory. Article I
unconditionally extends these benefits to all countries that produce or will pro-
duce the subject good. See GATP, supra note 5, art. I; see also GATT ANALYTI-
CAL INDEX: GUIDE TO GATT LAW AND PRACTICE 32 (6th ed. 1994) (explaining the
interpretive history of "originating in" and country of origin concepts used in
Article I). Hence, it is inferable the obligations that arise from the negotiations
are defined by the product and its producing countries, not by the interests for-
eign countries or their nationals may have in such products. See discussion
infra Part IVA.
115. See PESCATORE, supra note 101, at 75.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id. The United States has predominantly lobbied for a more adjudica-
tory or legalistic dispute settlement GATT model, while the EC and Japan have
continuously opposed it. Id. Less developed countries and non-European devel-
oped nations tend to favor a more legalistic model because it seems to offer more
protection for countries with little political and economic leverage in interna-
tional trade negotiations. Id.
119. See JACKSON, supra note 20, at 336 (stating that some drafters of the
Uruguay Round Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settle-
ment of Disputes (DSU) favored a more judicial-setting for dispute settlement);
see also id. at 348 (underscoring the panels' practice of citing other panels' deci-
sions suggesting a more consistent use of precedent, although panels are not
required to consider any previous decisions in the disposition of matters).
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inates GATT members' ability to veto panel reports or Appellate
Body decisions. 120 Such additions to the dispute settlement pro-
cess arguably enhance the credibility of the system in maintain-
ing the commitments that negotiators exchanged during
negotiations. 12 1
In light of the DSB's movement towards a more adjudica-
tory model, the absence of a doctrine of locus standi is likely to
become a more prominent deficiency in the WTO dispute settle-
ment mechanism. Accepting the legalistic model's construction
that GATT is premised on a "balance of concessions," the WTO
must examine the parties who request formation of panels in
view of the rights corresponding to such parties and whether
such rights entitle parties to remedies that will restore the
"balance."
Since the GATT members themselves, through adoption of
the DSU, defined the WTO's role consistent with an adjudica-
tory dispute settlement organ, a standing requirement should
not emerge as a revolutionary concept, but rather as a necessary
component of the adjudicatory process. The lack of a principled
basis on which to decide whether a specific petitioner possesses
the appropriate stake or interest in the dispute to bring the sub-
ject claim before the panel casts doubt on the WTO's ability to
settle disputes fairly. Such a principle of legal standing is nota-
bly relevant to the participation of the United States in the Ba-
nan. Case. A standing requirement would enable the DSB to
determine whether the parties who have asserted a claim are
the proper advocates for the equitable resolution of the dispute.
Despite the variety of arguments the United States advances in
its brief, the WTO, through the DSB, ought to deny the relief the
United States seeks in light of American and international legal
standing principles. To analyze this hypothesis in detail, it is
necessary to first explore the principles of standing as both U.S.
120. DSU, supra note 14, arts. 16-17. Perhaps the most compelling change
in the procedures of dispute settlement occurred in the manner in which con-
tracting parties adopt panel reports. Prior to the DSU, GATr members could
unilaterally veto a report by simply voting against it. Pursuant to the DSU, a
panel report may avoid immediate adoption, if it either gains appellate review
or if the Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) decides by consensus not to adopt the
report. Id. Thus, the DSU has practically eliminated any veto power for GATT
members. Notwithstanding the legalistically oriented dispute settlement proce-
dures, nineteen clauses throughout the GATT obligate members to engage in
consultations in specific instances with an eye towards avoiding unnecessary
intervention of the DSB. See JACKSON, supra note 20, at 338.
121. See JACKSON, supra note 20, at 332-33 (outlining arguments in support
of a more legalistic model).
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courts and the International Court of Justice have crafted and
applied them.
III. THE DOCTRINE OF STANDING: A UNIVERSAL
LEGAL CONCEPT
A. THE UNITED STATES: STANDING UNDER THE "CASE OR
CONTROVERSY" REQUIREMENT
Legal systems have historically operated to afford the citi-
zens or entities under the governance of their laws the access to
judicial processes that enable them to seek redress for wrongs
they have incurred. Structured into three branches of govern-
ment to heed constitutionally mandated separation of powers,
the United States assigned the duty of adjudicating the claims of
its citizens to the judicial branch. The judicial branch's jurisdic-
tion is limited, however, to those activities that are appropriate
under its province. 122 The "Case-or-Controversy" requirement
of Article III of the U.S. Constitution 23 is such a limitation on
the judiciary's scope of appropriate action. 124
The "Case-or-Controversy" requirement, however, identifies
the justiciability of disputes rather than the legal standing of
parties or the propriety of such parties to bring a suit.125 The
jurisprudential doctrine of standing is an essential and well-es-
tablished part of the "Case-or-Controversy" requirement of Arti-
122. Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 749 (1984); see generally JAMES E. RAD-
CLIFFE, Ti CASE-OR-CONTROVERSY PROVISION 11 (1978).
123. U.S. CONST. art. Il, § 2.
124. Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. at 750. Article I of the U.S. Constitution
defines that "judicial power" shall extend to certain types of "cases" and "contro-
versies." Case law has provided much needed interpretation of the scope of
terms like "judicial power" and "case or controversies." For example, in Musk-
rat v. United States, 219 U.S. 346 (1911), the Supreme Court defined the grant
ofjudicial power as "the right to determine actual controversies arising between
adverse litigants, duly instituted in courts of proper jurisdiction." Id. at 361. In
another case, Osborn v. Bank of the United States, the Court held that "a case
arises within the meaning of the Constitution, when any question respecting
the Constitution, treaties or laws of the United States have assumed 'such a
form that the judicial power is capable of acting on it'." RADCLIFFE, supra note
122, at 35.
125. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962) cited in Warth v. Seldin, 422
U.S. 490, 498-99 (1975) ("[Sltanding imports justiciability: [justiciability asks]
whether the plaintiff has made out a 'case or controversy' between himself and
the defendant within the meaning of Article Ill .... As an aspect of jus-
ticiability, the standing question is whether the 'plaintiff has alleged such a
personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to warrant his invocation of
federal-court jurisdiction and to justify exercise of the court's remedial powers
on his behalf.'"). Cf RONALD D. ROTUNDA, MODERN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW:
CASES AND NOTES 1092-93 (4th ed. 1993).
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cle III. Through common-law and statutory development, the
American doctrine of standing has become a principled basis on
which aggrieved citizens may ascertain whether they are em-
powered to assert a legal right before a court of law.126 An in-
quiry into standing aims to determine whether the claimants
seeking redress before the court are the appropriate parties to
exercise such rights in order to prevent or redress a wrong.127
Thus, the federal court must assess whether the party128 seek-
ing a remedy has "the proper interest in the legal right to invoke
federal judicial power." 129 By requiring plaintiffs to possess "the
126. See Northeastern Fla. Chapter of the Associated Gen. Contractors of
Am. v. City of Jacksonville, Fla., 508 U.S. 656, 663 (1993) (holding contractor
association had standing to challenge the constitutionality of city ordinance).
Standing is not the same as the "Case-or-Controversy" constitutional require-
ment, but is rather an indispensable component of this requirement. Id.
127. Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. at 752. Cf. Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. at 498
cited in Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. at 750-51 (reducing the "question of standing
[to] whether the litigant is entitled to have the court decide the merits of the
dispute or of particular issues").
128. American courts apply the doctrine of standing based on the type of
petitioner that opts to invoke federal judicial authority. Specifically, the courts
subject taxpayers and non-taxpayers to distinct and separate doctrinal rubrics.
Compare Flast v. Cohen 392 U.S. 83 (1968) with Valley Forge Christian College
v. Americans United for the Separation of Church and State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464
(1982) (applying contrasting analytical approaches to standing issues based on
tax-payer and non-taxpayer status). The primary analytical structure of this
Note is premised on the non-taxpayer formula, but incorporates some of the
elements of tax-payer standing into the overall analysis. Non-taxpayer stand-
ing doctrine essentially requires an "injury in fact" in addition to a "causal con-
nection" between the action complained of and the injury alleged. See
Gladstone Realtors v. Village of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91, 99 (1979) and Simon v.
Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 38 (1976) both cited in Valley
Forge, 454 U.S. at 472. In Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl. Study Group, 438
U.S. 59 (1978), the majority stated that "where the injury alleged is a concrete
and particularized one which will be prevented or redressed by the relief re-
quested, the basic practical and prudential concerns underlying the standing
doctrine are generally satisfied when the constitutional requisites are met." Id.
at 80-81.
129. RADCLIFFE, supra note 122, at 95 (explaining the usage of the term "'in-
terest'[ I to denote the parties' relationship to the disputed legal right: Does the
party possess the requisite relationship to the disputed legal right so that he
should be permitted to commence or defend a 'case' or 'controversy'"). See also
Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. at 88 (asserting that "it is both appropriate and neces-
sary [for courts] to look at the substantive issues for another purpose, namely,
to determine whether there is a logical nexus between the status asserted and
the claim sought to be adjudicated."). Federal standing seeks to exclude claim-
ants from adjudicatory circumstances when they lack sufficient personal stake
in the outcome of the controversy as to assure a necessary level of concrete ad-
verseness which would sharpen the presentation of issues. See Sierra Club v.
Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 740 (1972) (underscoring that "[t~he requirement that a
party seeking review must allege facts showing that he is himself adversely
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proper interest," the common law demands that plaintiffs show
they possess the requisite relationship to the disputed legal
right so that they should be permitted to commence or defend a
"case or controversy." 130
Common law played a substantial role in fashioning a
standing doctrine. The common law resulted in the establish-
ment of an "irreducible constitutional minimum" that the com-
plaining party must satisfy to be a proper party to the
dispute. 131 This established test contains three elements: (1)
the plaintiff must have suffered an "injury in fact" - an inva-
sion of a legally protected interest which is concrete and particu-
larized, and which is actual and imminent, not merely
conjectural or hypothetical; (2) there must be a causal connec-
tion between the injury and the alleged injurious conduct, which
means that "the injury has to be 'fairly . .. trace[able] to the
challenged action of the defendant, and not ... t[he] result [of]
the independent action of some third party not before the court";
and (3) "it must be 'likely,' as opposed to merely 'speculative,'
that the injury will be 'redressed by a favorable decision'."132 In
addition to this established test, federal courts acknowledge
their latitude in utilizing prudential limitations, which provide
non-constitutional judgments about what constitutes wise policy
in administering the judiciary, to determine the standing of a
certain claimant.' 33
affected ... does serve as at least a rough attempt to put the decision as to
whether review will be sought in the hands of those who have a direct stake in
the outcome."); see also JoHN E. NowAK & RONALD D. RoTuNDA, CONSTITU-
TIONAL LAw 75 (4th ed. 1991).
130. See Flast v. Cohen 392 U.S. at 102 ("inquiries into the nexus between
the status asserted by the litigant and the claim he presents are essential to
assure that he is a proper and appropriate party to invoke federal judicial
power.").
131. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992).
132. Id. at 560-61. Plaintiffs who claim that their injuries are not the direct
result of a governmental action against them per se, but rather are the product
of governmental action against a third party, may have recourse to legal reme-
dies as well. In Lujan, the court cited a substantially higher burden of proof on
plaintiffs who are not themselves the object of the government action or inac-
tion which they challenge, but declined to exclude the possibility of redress for
them. Id. at 562.
133. See Valley Forge, 454 U.S. at 474 (highlighting federal courts' discre-
tion to invoke prudential limitations or considerations as a policy tool in ad-
ministering the standing doctrine). For example, the prudential standing rule
normally bars litigants from asserting the rights or legal interests of others, as
well as prohibits the adjudication of generalized grievances more appropriately
addressed in the political branches. See id. at 474-75. Despite the rule being
premised on judicial self-governance, Congress may limit the courts' application
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B. THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE (ICJ): STANDING IN
INTER-GOVERNMENTAL BODIES
Other established national judiciaries, such as the Cana-
dian and British systems, employ standing doctrines that seek
to achieve the primary objective of determining whether a party
who brings a claim before a tribunal possesses an appropriate
stake in the controversy to advocate such interests.1 3 4 This
norm also extends into the international legal model, as evi-
denced by the International Court of Justice's use of a standing
doctrine. The ICJ acts as the principal organ of the United Na-
tions ("U.N."), and derives its structure and function from a for-
mal statute annexed to the U.N. Charter.13 5 Although the ICJ's
standing doctrine is not as well-developed as the American doc-
trine, it nonetheless provides guidance for the creation of a prin-
cipled GATT doctrine of standing. This is especially true
because the multilateral political climate in which the ICJ ad-
ministers its doctrine is akin to the environment in which the
WTO settles disputes. The ICJ's two-part standing test, articu-
lated in Case Concerning Barcelona Traction, Light and Power
Company ("Barcelona Traction"), requires an evaluation of (1)
whether the defendant state broke an obligation towards the
complaining national state with respect to its nationals, and (2)
whether only the party to whom an international obligation is
due is bringing the claim in respect of its breach. 36
The crux of the ICJ's standard focuses more on the duties or
obligations that a state owes another state in order to ascertain
whether the aggrieved state has any cause of action grounded in
of it by acting to remove it per statutory preemption so long as it does not ex-
ceed Article III case or controversy requirements. See Ass'n of Data Processing
Service Orgs., Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 154 (1970); see also NowAK & Ro-
TUNDA, supra note 129, at 80, 83. Not surprisingly, the Supreme Court has
tended to grant standing more often when matters fall within the "zone of inter-
est" protected by a federal statute, or if a statute appears to specifically grant
standing in the case. Id. at 76.
134. See generally MINISTRY OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL, REPORT ON THE
LAW OF STANDING 10-18 (1989); PATRICK BIRKINsHAw, GRIEvANCES, REMEDIES
AND THE STATE 259-63 (2d ed. 1994).
135. Article XIV of the United Nations Charter founded the International
Court of Justice ("ICJ"), which acts as the principal organ of the United Nations
("U.N.") pursuant to the Charter. U.N. CHARTER art. XIV, para. 92. Original
U.N. members embodied the structure and function of the ICJ in a formal stat-
ute annexed to the U.N. Charter. Statute of the International Court of Justice,
June 26, 1945, Stat. 1031.
136. Barcelona Traction, supra note 16, 35 (quoting Advisory Opinion,
Reparation for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Nations, 1949
I.C.J. 174, 181-82 (Apr. 11)).
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a right. This sort of inquiry requires delving into the process
whereby parties create and assume obligations, and into the
rights that countries have to seek reparations for the transgres-
sion of the accorded duties. Further, the ICJ test aims to extend
its adjudicatory jurisdiction only to those parties who are proper
and logical recipients of the obligations that were breached.
Thus, only such parties deprived of the benefits flowing from an
obligation as a result of the alleged violation of such obligation
have standing to bring a claim before the ICJ.
The foregoing two models provide the GATT with a starting
point on how to sculpt a formal standing doctrine. The archi-
tects of a GATT doctrine of standing should aim to develop a
hybrid of these two models within the parameters of both the
specific mission of the GATT adjudicatory entity to maintain the
"balance of concessions," and the particular dynamics that sur-
round GATT as a multilateral effort to liberalize trade. The ap-
plication of both doctrines to the Banana Case confirms the need
for such a formal doctrine of standing in the GATT dispute set-
tlement mechanism.
IV. WHY THE UNITED STATES LACKS STANDING IN
THE BANANA CASE
A. ANALYsis UNDER THE AMERICAN DocTRNE OF STANDING
In 1994, Chiquita Brands International, Inc., the Hawaiian
Banana Industry Association, and Dole Foods ("U.S. firms") col-
lectively exhorted the United States government to file a peti-
tion before the WTO to protect their interests in the trade of
bananas with the EC and the BFA countries.' 3 7 The U.S. firms,
as companies that produce, distribute, and market bananas
world-wide, sought to preserve the volume of Latin America ba-
nanas they shipped to Europe, the world's largest market for ba-
nanas.Y38 The firms provide these services through their U.S.
incorporated parent companies or through their owned and con-
trolled subsidiary entities established in EC or third coun-
tries.139  These firms summoned the U.S. government's
intervention by alleging their inability to handle the same or
larger volume of bananas for marketing and distribution serv-
137. See supra Part I.E. (explaining the process the United States chose to
act on the U.S. firms' petition).
138. See Brief for the U.S., supra note 4, 140.
139. Id. 1 141.
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ices as a result of the EC banana import regime and the BFA. 140
Under the American doctrine of standing, the U.S. government
must demonstrate it has the requisite interest in the assertion of
its legal right to seek redress for this alleged wrong.141 In doing
so, the United States must first show that it suffered a concrete
and particularized injury in fact as a result of the EC banana
regime and the BFA.142 Primarily, the United States argues
that three different actions taken under these two arrangements
caused injury: (1) discriminatory treatment of below-quota third
country bananas; 43 (2) discriminatory application of country-
specific allocations and allowance for intra-BFA country reallo-
cation of shares in the BFA;'4 and (3) distribution of import
licenses amounting to 30% of the total third country tariff quota
to Category B operators in contravention of Articles I, III, X and
the Licensing Agreement. 145 The United States adduced evi-
dence that such actions by the EC not only diminished the ex-
portable quantities of bananas from third countries, but also
reduced the U.S. firms' business in handling bananas because of,
inter alia, higher duties on third country bananas and no coun-
try-specific allocations to non-BFA countries. 146 Further, the
United States, a marketer of third country or non-traditional
ACP bananas (Category A),147 specifically claimed that the dis-
proportionate issuance of 30% of the third country tariff-rate
quota licenses to marketers of EC and/or traditional ACP ba-
nanas resulted in a concrete injury to U.S. firms because they
are unable to reach the banana marketing volumes prior to the
licensing scheme. 148 The U.S. firms undeniably suffered injury
from the EC's actions. These injuries and their relief, however,
140. See supra Part I.E.2. The U.S. firms engage in distribution services
which encompass "buying and selling of bananas, compliance with regulatory
and administrative requirements, quality control, inspection and testing, the
physical movement of the bananas over long and short distances, ripening prior
to retail sale, and sales promotion activities." See Brief for the U.S., supra note
4, 140.
141. See supra notes 126-29 and accompanying text.
142. See supra note 132 and accompanying text.
143. See supra note 77 and accompanying text.
144. See supra notes 78-89 and accompanying text.
145. See supra note 95 and accompanying text; see also supra notes 42-46
and accompanying text (discussing EEC 404/93's licensing scheme).
146. See Brief for the U.S., supra note 4, 147-50. EEC 404/93 uses "third
country" to refer to any non-ACP country that exports bananas to the EC. The
BFA grants country-specific quota allocations to five of these third countries.
Thus, all BFA and non-BFA countries are "third countries," but only five "third
countries" are BFA countries.
147. See supra note 42-45 and accompanying text.
148. Brief for the U.S., supra note 4, 149.
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must be examined in light of the GATT's dispute settlement
mission.
When assessing the element of particular injury under the
American doctrine of standing, the WTO/DSB must recognize
that its primordial objective is to restore the "balance of conces-
sions" that a transgression against GATT principles or an im-
pediment to the achievement of a GATT objective may
disrupt. 149 In other words, to determine whether injury exists
under the GATT dispute settlement mission, a party must show
that it is a logical recipient of the benefits it claims to have lost
because it has a direct relationship to the product on which the
corresponding obligation is premised. 150 GATT Article I im-
pliedly asserts the requirement of such a relationship between
the claimant/tariff beneficiary and the product by mandating
that "any ... privilege ... granted by any contracting party to
any product originating in . . . any other country shall be ac-
corded immediately and unconditionally to the like product
originating in . . . the territories of all other contracting par-
ties."151 This language illuminates an intention by GATT's
drafters to require a nexus between the GATT member claiming
discriminatory treatment and the product of which it complains.
The complaining country has the latitude to properly claim dis-
crimination even to the extent that another GATT member re-
fuses to afford the same treatment as afforded to all other
members to a "like product" created in its territory. 152 Article I,
however, fails to allow GATT members to properly claim dis-
crimination by other GATT members for products that are pro-
duced in the territory of other GATT members.' 53
In this case, the injuries to which the United States points
affect both U.S.-based parent firms and U.S.-owned subsidiaries
in Latin America and Europe that engage in the production, dis-
tribution, and marketing of Latin American bananas to serve
the EC market. Such subsidiaries exploited the benefits of any
obligations the EC assumed toward substantial Latin American
banana producing countries. According to Article I, the rights
that arose out of negotiated trade concessions in bananas corre-
spond to those countries that not only produce bananas, but also
export bananas from within their territory. Guatemala, Hondu-
149. See supra notes 113-14 and accompanying text.
150. Id.
151. GATT, supra note 5, art. I (emphasis added).
152. Id.
153. See GATT ANALYTicAL INDEx, supra note 114, at 32.
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ras, Ecuador and Mexico each produce and export bananas
originating in their territory. The EC irrefutably injured the ba-
nana trade expectations of these Latin American countries by
failing to afford the bananas which originated in their territories
treatment as favorable as accorded to other GATT and non-
GATT members. Thus, these Latin American third countries
are each logical claimants to injury resulting from a violation
that impairs their ability to export their home-grown
bananas.' 5 4
The injuries alleged by these third countries, however, are
entirely different from the injuries the United States alleges its
firms' marketing and distributing services incurred. As noted
above, the only obligation the EC assumed under GATT was de-
fined by the product in question and the territory in which it was
produced. Because the United States is not complaining about
its restricted ability to produce and export U.S.-grown bananas,
it cannot rely on the MFN protection of Article I. Hence, the
American claim of injury as a result of an infringement on its
ability to export bananas grown in a foreign territory is mis-
placed. From this perspective, the United States would fail to
meet its burden in asserting standing to seek relief for injuries
that U.S. firms suffered under the GATT in terms of trade in
goods.
Assuming arguendo, however, that the United States could
prove that U.S. firms suffered a particular and concrete injury, it
must then prove under the American doctrine that a causal con-
nection exists between the lost benefits and the EC banana im-
port regime and the BFA.155 The United States may easily
satisfy this element since EEC 404/93 and the BFA both
prompted a decrease in exportable bananas in countries where
U.S. firms operated, and allocated roughly one-third of the U.S.'
previous tariff-quota licenses to Category B operators.' 5 6
The final element of the American test is the likelihood of
redressability by a favorable decision.157 The U.S. plight for
154. Id.
155. See supra note 132 and accompanying text.
156. See Brief for the U.S., supra note 4, 1 149-50 (blaming EEC 404/93 for
reconfiguring the Latin American banana-service market, which precipitated
the transfer of a substantial portion of service activities, market-share, and
profit-making opportunities enjoyed by the United States to other third country
banana service firms).
157. See supra note 132 and accompanying text; see also Warth v. Seldin,
422 U.S. at 505-07 (highlighting a situation where the court declined plaintiffs
standing because the requested relief would not have necessarily redressed
their grievance).
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standing succumbs before this final hurdle. Recalling the DSB's
primary mission to restore the "balance of concessions," 15s it
must tailor a remedy that responds to the lost benefits that par-
ties secured by virtue of their relationship to the product in
question. Once again, the United States does not stand in a po-
sition to assert a legal right for relief given that it is not a sub-
stantial banana-producing nation, and thus not a logical
beneficiary of any banana tariff concession accorded by the EC.
The Banana Case presents a situation where goods are trans-
acted between countries. Granting standing to the United
States on behalf of U.S. marketing and distribution firms due to
the EC's failure to administer its tariff quota equitably among
BFA and non-BFA countries is incongruent. Accordingly, the
Panel should fashion remedies based on its goal of restoring the
"balance of concessions" only for those countries that are proper
beneficiaries of the tariff commitment as defined by both the
product in question and the territory in which such product
originated. Under GATT, any relief warranted by the EC's ba-
nana schemes with ACP and BFA countries must respond to a
violation of obligations regarding tariff concessions to banana-
producing countries, which is a criterion the United States sim-
ply fails to satisfy. Even if the DSB considered the United
States a banana-producing nation in light of its comparatively
minimal production documented in its brief to the WTO, the
DSB should consider fashioning relief equal to the value of U.S.
losses incurred from being unable to export such bananas be-
cause of the EC's actions. This would still comport with the
DSB's mission to restore the "balance of concessions," instead of
overcompensating for the injury that transpired from the breach
of tariff commitments. Thus, under the American doctrine of
standing, Ecuador, Honduras, Guatemala, and Mexico satisfy
the standing requirement, whereas the United States is an im-
proper party to assert the interests of its national firms.
The policies underlying the American doctrine of standing
fortify this conclusion. Motivated by the American adversarial
system, jurists who molded this doctrine were concerned with
having the most zealous advocacy possible in defense of the in-
terests at stake in the controversy. 159 Logically, these jurists
concluded that the specific parties with such interests at stake
could advocate most effectively on their behalf, and thus could
sharpen the issues and present the most favorable arguments to
158. See supra note 149 and accompanying text.
159. See supra note 133 and accompanying text.
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the court.160 In the Banana Case, the United States shares the
same interests with the Latin-American countries in respect to
the equitable administration of the tariff-quota and the BFA
shortfall reallocation provision. They each want to maximize
the level of bananas that can be exported to the EC from within
the territories of the complaining Latin American countries.
Although no injury need be alleged to claim a violation of the
GATT, it is clear that the injury alleged as a result of the tariff-
quota administration corresponds to the Latin American nations
that produce and export bananas from within their territories,
and they alone are the best advocates of their own interests.
Surely, the U.S. presence in the claim of these two issues is dis-
pensable given that any relief granted will satisfy the American
interests equally as well.
The U.S. argument surrounding the issue of operator li-
cense administration, however, eludes such a categorical dispo-
sition. The interests of the United States with respect to this
issue are separable from the interests of the Latin American
complainants. Thus, without the United States as a co-claim-
ant, the Latin American countries are not the most effective ad-
vocates for the United States with respect to the issuance of
operator licenses. Such countries are concerned mostly with re-
alizing their banana export capacity irrespective of which mar-
keting firms handle the export/import processes of such
bananas. The United States clearly holds more of an interest in
protecting the massive market share that U.S. firms hold in ba-
nana marketing and distribution services to the EC. This issue,
however, is better analyzed under the ICJ doctrine of standing
discussed below.
The American standing principles provide a seemingly rigid
filtration device to segregate parties who have the appropriate
stake in the controversy from those who lack such requisite in-
terest. International legal principles of standing add other valu-
able elements to the American formula. Furthermore, the
doctrine of standing that the ICJ employs serves to enhance the
possibility of a suitable GATT standing calculus because it
presents a model shaped in a multilateral environment, rather
160. Id.; see also Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962) cited in Flast v.
Cohen, 392 U.S. at 99 (identifying the "gist of the question of standing' [to be]
whether the party seeking relief has 'alleged such a personal stake in the out-
come of the controversy as to assure... concrete adverseness which sharpens
the presentation of issues upon which the court so largely depends for illumina-
tion of difficult constitutional questions'").
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than in an idiosyncratic national system, and more closely re-
sembles the dynamics in which GATT operates.
B. ANALYSIS UNDER THE ICJ STANDING TEST
1. Obligations and Rights of a State Under Barcelona
Traction
Over a span of almost two decades, the International Court
of Justice heard Case Concerning Barcelona Traction, Light and
Power Company, in which it analyzed the legal principles and
policies overseeing a government's right to assert the interests
of its national shareholders in a foreign company. 16 1 Although
the facts of Barcelona Traction vary considerably from the sub-
ject dispute, the majority's assessment of the claim to standing
that interested parties assert is useful in exploring the limits on
the United States' right to bring the claim of U.S. firms' before
the WTO.162 The constructive component of Barcelona Traction
lies not so much in its holding, but rather in the analytical gui-
dance the court provides in scrutinizing (1) the extension of a
state's diplomatic protection over its nationals, and (2) the obli-
gations that states owe each other amidst legal standing and
sovereignty concerns.
Barcelona Traction concerned a claim the Belgian govern-
ment submitted against Spain on behalf of Belgian nationals
and shareholders who owned over 90% of a Canadian corpora-
tion that owned the Spanish Barcelona Traction Company.163
Belgium alleged that unlawful acts of Spanish authorities
caused damage to the financial interests of its national share-
holders in Barcelona Traction and thus entitled them to seek
reparations from the Spanish government. 64 The Belgian com-
plaint argued that the treatment Spanish courts afforded the
Barcelona Traction Company in its pursuit of share transfer dis-
putes related to other transactions harmed its shareholders
stake in the company, and such an action was in contravention
161. Barcelona Traction, supra note 16.
162. The WTO and the ICJ differ significantly in their institutional frame-
work and administration of dispute settlement. Notwithstanding these differ-
ences, the law the ICJ developed may serve as a useful guide to fashioning a
viable standing doctrine for the WTO. The WTO might borrow the ICJ's "stand-
ing" guidelines since they both arguably operate in similar political multilateral
climates.
163. Barcelona Traction, supra note 16.
164. Id. 1 28-29.
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of international law principles. 165 The ICJ addressed the issue
of standing before turning to the merits of the case. 166
The court framed the standing issue in terms of whether
Belgium had a right to exercise diplomatic protection of Belgian
shareholders in a company incorporated in Canada for violations
of international law against the company rather than against
the Belgian nationals themselves. 167 The ICJ evaluated
Belgium's standing under the following two part test: (1)
whether the defendant state (Spain) broke an obligation towards
the national State (Belgium) in respect to its nationals, and (2)
whether only the party to whom an international obligation is
due is bringing the claim with respect to the breach. 168
In announcing such a test, the Court essentially reduced its
task to determining whether Spain violated a right of Belgium
"on account of its nationals' having suffered infringement of
their rights as shareholders in a company not of Belgian nation-
ality."169 Hence, the disposition of whether Belgium had the
legal capacity to bring its nationals' claim before the ICJ reposed
on the existence (or absence) of a right belonging to Belgium and
recognized as such by international law. 170
By acknowledging that the obligation an offending party vi-
olates must belong to the foreign state on account of its nation-
als, the court necessarily implicated the foreign state's exercise
of diplomatic protection as the only vehicle through which the
foreign state may assert a right on behalf of its nationals. 171
The ICJ considered the foreign state's exercise of such a right as
"necessarily limited to intervention [by a State] on behalf of its
own nationals."172 The Court viewed the exercise of such right
as limited to diplomatic protection "because, in the absence of a
special agreement, ... the bond of nationality between the State
and the individual ... alone confers upon the State the right of
165. Id. 28.
166. American standing doctrine principles theoretically mandate that
courts conduct the standing analysis before considering the merits of a case. In
practice, however, courts often evaluate the merits of a case and either grant or
deny standing based on the validity or probable outcome of the case. See No-
wAK & RoTUNDA, supra note 129, at 82-83.
167. See Barcelona Traction, supra note 16, 32.
168. Id. 35 (quoting Advisory Opinion Reparation for Injuries Suffered in
the Service of the United Nations, 1949 I.C.J. 174, 181-82 (Apr. 11)).
169. Id. I35.
170. Id. 36.
171. Id.
172. Id. (quoting Panevezys-Saldutiskis Railway, 1939 P.C.I.J. (ser. A/B)
No. 76, at 16 (Feb. 28)).
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diplomatic protection, and [because such exercise of diplomatic
protection must nonetheless envisage] the right to take up a
claim and to ensure respect [for] international law... .173 Thus,
the Court reasoned that the question of whether a right corre-
sponds to a foreign state and derivatively to its beneficiary na-
tionals must be answered in light of general rules of diplomatic
protection.174
2. Limitations to a State's Exercise of Diplomatic Protection
The International Court of Justice underscored the general
international rule that "[w]hen a State admits into its territory
foreign investments or foreign nationals, whether natural or ju-
ristic persons, it is bound to extend to them the protection of the
law and assumes obligations concerning the treatment to be af-
forded them."175 The obligations a host state owes to foreign
natural or juristic persons permanently situated in the host
state, however, do not necessarily implicate the rights of a for-
eign state to assert the interests of its nationals situated in such
foreign jurisdiction. 176 Consistent with this observation, the
ICJ announced a compelling proviso to the general rule by dis-
tinguishing between the obligations a state owes the interna-
tional community as a whole, and the obligations owed only to
another state.177 It considered the former type of obligations
erga omnes,1 78 which confer on all states a right to protection of
173. Id. (quoting Panevezys-Saldutiskis Railway, 1939 P.C.I.J. at 16).
174. Id. "Although individuals ... have some independent status ... in
international law, the principle relationships between individuals and interna-
tional law still run through the state, and their place in international life de-
pends largely on their status as nationals of states." JACKSON, supra note 20, at
264 (quoting RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW OF FOREIGN RELATIONS O] THE
UNITED STATES, Part II, Introductory Note at 70-71 (1987)). Notwithstanding
this norm, international law and various international agreements are increas-
ingly recognizing human rights of individuals and sometimes grant individuals
relief before international bodies. Id. The slow trend towards recognizing indi-
vidual rights in multilateral tribunals thus raises some questions as to the
WTO's requirement for a state's exercise of diplomatic protection over its dis-
gruntled nationals in order to assert a claim before the WTO.
175. Barcelona Traction, supra note 16, 1 33.
176. Id.
177. Id.
178. Id. Outlawing acts of aggression and genocide, or rules calling for the
protection of fundamental human rights, such as measures against slavery or
racial discrimination, exemplify the level of importance warranted for the host
state to have an erga omnes obligation towards the international community as
a whole. Hans W. Baade, The Operation of Foreign Public Law, 30 TEx. INT'L
L.J. 429, 445 (1995). Another erga omnes obligation is embodied in the right of
every state to live in peace, free of threat or use of force against its territorial
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a particular legal interest from the host jurisdiction. 179 In other
words, where erga omnes obligations are involved, individuals
may assert their basic human rights on which the obligations
are based without the intermediary of diplomatic protection.18 0
The ICJ, however, failed to ubiquitously extend the same
right to unequivocal assertion of a legal interest to all obliga-
tions a state assumes concerning the treatment afforded to the
admitted national or juristic persons. 18 1 In cases concerning
non-erga omnes obligations, the performance of which is the sub-
ject of diplomatic protection, the Court specifically recognized
Barcelona Traction's two-prong test as the means to determine
whether the state seeking to protect the interests of its nationals
may do so in accordance with international law principles of
standing.182
integrity or political independence. See Military and Paramilitary Activities in
and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.) 1984 I.C.J. 168, 196 (Order of May 10)
(dissenting opinion of Judge Schwebel).
179. Barcelona Traction, supra note 16, 1 33.
180. Baade, supra note 178, at 445. Whether any action taken by a state
that offends GATT' principles in the context of trade will ever rise to the level of
erga-omnes is debatable. Theoretically, a party that violates basic human
rights through some pernicious trade practice might bypass the need for diplo-
matic protection. In the context of GATr, the requirement for a state to exer-
cise diplomatic protection over its nationals in order to assert a claim depends
on the domestic legal effect that a particular country has given to the GATT.
JACKSON, supra note 20, at 128. For example, the U.S. Congress enacted imple-
menting legislation that made GATT part of a quasi-separate legal system from
that of domestic law. See Uruguay Round Agreements Act, § 102; see also John
J. Jackson, Status of Treaties in Domestic Legal Systems, 96 AM. J. INT'L L. 310,
313-15 (1992), reprinted in JACKSON, supra note 20, at 126. In effect, such an
action by Congress prevents not only suits against the United States in its own
courts but also requires American citizens to invoke their government's inter-
vention in seeking relief from the WTO. Id. Although discussion of diplomatic
protection may seem superfluous to the American involvement in the Banana
Case because the U.S. government must bring any claim of American citizens
under GAT, it is an essential component to the formulation of a GATTI stand-
ing doctrine. The possibility that current and future GAIT members may differ
from the United States in the legal effect given to GAIT vis-a-vis their domestic
laws accentuates the need for such a discussion of diplomatic protection.
181. See Barcelona Traction, supra note 16, 1 35 ("It cannot be held, when
one [erga omnes] obligation in particular is in question, in a specific case, that
all States have a legal interest in its observance.").
182. Id.; see Baade, supra note 178, at 445 (juxtaposing the different re-
course entities or individuals may have with respect to asserting a legal inter-
est in cases where states owe an erga omnes obligation with cases where states
owe a lesser obligation (non-erga omnes)).
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3. American Diplomatic Protection over U.S. Firms
In Barcelona Traction, any obligations Spain owed Barce-
lona Traction stemmed from the international rule which man-
dates the extension of a host state's laws and protection to any
foreign natural or juristic persons permanently situated in its
jurisdiction.183 With respect to these specific obligations, the
ICJ did not consider "all States .. . to have a legal interest in
their protection." 18 4 Hence, the Court categorized the Spanish
authorities' failure to adequately protect the financial operation
of the Barcelona Traction company or ensure the Belgian share-
holders investment in the company as violations of non-erga
omnes obligations.'8 5
In defining the type of obligations present in the Banana
Case, it is inconsistent with the ICJ's broad guidelines to raise
the magnitude of the EC's obligations to the United States, third
countries, or their nationals above the erga omnes threshold. In
short, to find any GATT obligations the EC assumed with re-
spect to banana trade to be erga-omnes would dislocate the in-
ternational law system of right recognition.
Unlike the U.S. doctrine of standing, a GATT standing doc-
trine should include an evaluation similar to the ICJ standing
doctrine so that the DSB may properly assess whether diplo-
matic protection is warranted. A judgment on whether individu-
als may bypass seeking the cloak of diplomatic protection in
order to assert their legal interests is therefore important.
Those individuals who fail to rest their claim on the breach of an
erga-omnes obligation are then compelled to pursue diplomatic
intervention by their state. At this juncture, the DSB may apply
the Barcelona Traction test to ascertain the legal standing of the
parties in question, who merit close scrutiny considering that an
improper assertion of interests by such state may impair the
challenged country's sovereignty.' 8 6 Any obligations the EC
owes the United States with respect to its nationals and third
countries should not rise to erga omnes status. Thus, the rights
183. See supra note 175 and accompanying text.
184. See Barcelona Traction, supra note 16, 33. The ICJ analyzed the Bel-
gian claim in light of diplomatic protection principles which confirms its conclu-
sion that any obligations Spain breached with respect to Belgium with respect
to its nationals were non-erga omnes. See id.
185. See supra notes 175-80 and accompanying text.
186. See Barcelona Traction, supra note 16, 37 ("Diplomatic protection
deals with a very sensitive area of international relations, since the interest of a
foreign State in the protection of its nationals confronts the rights of the territo-
rial sovereign...").
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the United States seeks to assert by exercising diplomatic pro-
tection over these U.S. firms are subject to the Barcelona Trac-
tion test.'8 7
4. The First Prong of the ICJ Standing Test Applied to the
Banana Case
The first part of the ICJ test requires the defendant state
(EC) to have violated an obligation towards the United States in
respect to its nationals.' 88 Once again, this Note focuses strictly
on the U.S. arguments related to trade in goods, under which
the United States alleges that the EC violated Articles I, III, X,
XI, and XIII through its enactment of EEC 404/93 and the
BFA.18 9 Although analysis of this prong of the test is similar to
that of the injury element of the American doctrine, the question
of whether the EC owed an obligation to the United States with
respect to its nationals is less demanding. In response to this
inquiry, the DSB should examine GATT's principal obligations
in conjunction with the manner in which GATT parties formu-
late obligations toward each other during negotiations, while
also considering the legal and economic premises on which
GATT operates.
GATT represents an evolution of quasi-contracts which par-
ties continuously seek to modify based on surveys of their pro-
duction strengths and weaknesses in order to capitalize on and
compensate for their competitive advantages and disadvan-
tages. 190 This foundational impetus drives negotiation rounds,
which occur every six to eight years. Parties manifest the obli-
gations they assume toward each other in the negotiations. Nat-
urally, reciprocity nurtures any motivation to accept an
obligation. Irrespective of the unlikelihood of its genuine
achievement, reaching a "balance of concessions" between all
participants is the ultimate goal of GATT.' 9 ' The MFN princi-
ple, however, requires a state that affords certain tariff conces-
sions to a GATT or non-GATT country to equally and
unconditionally extend such privilege to all other GATT coun-
187. See supra note 182 and accompanying text.
188. See supra note 136 and accompanying text.
189. See supra Part I.E.1.
190. JACKSON, supra note 20, at 7-12, 15-18, 384-85. Although the commit-
ments GATT members exchange must be honored pursuant to Article II, GATT
recognizes the changing economic dynamics of the contracting parties and thus
provides for opportunities to modify the schedule of concession pursuant to Arti-
cle XXVIII. See GATT, supra note 5, arts. II, XXIII.
191. See supra notes 113-14 and accompanying text.
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tries.1 92 The result of such a requirement is an aberration of the
goal of "balance of concessions" because of the problem of free-
riders it creates. 193 Notwithstanding this tension between the-
ory and reality, the GATT functions remarkably well fueled by
the concept of reciprocity while cautioned by the known exploita-
tion of concessions by free-riders.
By virtue of GATT Article I's MFN obligation, the EC, as the
world's largest banana importer, extended a fixed tariff conces-
sion to any GATT country that produced bananas and exported
them from within the producing territory. 194 The United States
has never produced bananas in its territory for exporting pur-
poses. It therefore could not consider the small volume of ba-
nanas it produces to be a significant incentive for the exchange
of a tariff concession. In spite of the low-volume of bananas the
U.S. produces, Article I's MFN tenet commands that any benefit
accorded to a country with respect to a product must be similarly
extended to all GATT members.195 This principle allows a coun-
try that is not a producing nation at the time the concession is
extended to benefit from such concession if at any moment in the
future it becomes a producer of the product (or like product) in-
volved in the concession. Thus, if the United States ever in-
creased its production to a level where it was able to export
quantities to the EC, it would certainly have a more compelling
argument for standing in a claim against the EC protectionist
banana schemes.
Furthermore, because of the U.S. status as a country that
does not produce bananas for export purposes, the EC cannot
view the United States' current predicament as enticing enough
to exchange concessions, to wit reciprocate the value of one tariff
concession for the other. In contrast, the EC may consider Ecua-
dor, Guatemala, and Honduras, all substantial Latin American
banana producers, as worthy candidates for reciprocal tariff con-
cessions in exchange for the EC's tariff obligations.196 Such
192. See supra note 108 and accompanying text.
193. See supra notes 113-14 and accompanying text.
194. See supra notes 149-54 and accompanying text (explaining the implied
limitations GAIT Article I imposes on plaintiffs seeking to defend a claim in
defense of a breach to an obligation in GATT).
195. See supra note 108 and accompanying text.
196. GATr commentators offer various reasons for utilizing tariffs as the
preferred mode for advancing trade relations. For example, they posit that tar-
iffs are more transparent than other trade barriers, a feature which facilitates
negotiation for lower import duties. Further, scholars emphasize the incentives
tariffs present exporters - once a GATT member commits to a tariff level, ex-
porters are better able to project the production capacities of their businesses so
1997]
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analysis is consistent with the notions of reciprocity and "bal-
ance of concessions," which are the cornerstones of GATT. 97
Thus, GATT portrays a web of obligations that are defined
strictly by the product grown, manufactured, or processed in the
territory from where it is exported. The salient question is
whether the EC owes any obligation to the United States with
respect to its nationals.
Based on GATT operating economic principles and the man-
ner in which obligations are secured, any obligations the EC as-
sumed as a result of tariff commitments on bananas run directly
to substantial banana-producing GATT members who export
such product to the EC. To allow the United States to seek relief
for the alleged breach of an obligation concerning a product that
it does not produce within its territory for export purposes is in-
congruent with GATT's premises. 198 Under the first prong of
the Barcelona Traction test, the DSB should not decide the EC
owed an obligation to the United States or much less that it
breached an obligation owed to the United States with respect to
U.S. firms.' 99 Such a conclusion precludes the United States
from successfully invoking diplomatic protection over its firms in
order to assert their interests in the instant case. Accordingly,
they may make necessary industry adjustments to increase efficiency. By es-
tablishing a visible tariff goal for exporters, GATT encourages producers to be-
come more efficient since doing so enables producers to "jump" the tariff hurdle
and reap the financial rewards. See JACKSON, supra note 20, at 377 ("[If a for-
eign based industry is efficient enough, it will still be able to export to tariff-
imposing countries."); see also 1994 Panel Report, supra note 7, 20, at 185
("The fundamental principle embodied in the provisions of [GATT Art. II] were
essentially the security and predictability of the tariff concessions granted by
one contracting party to the remaining contracting parties.").
197. See supra notes 113-14 and accompanying text.
198. Ecuador, Honduras, Guatemala, and Mexico, however, did participate
in achieving the balance of concessions. The DSU establishes a vehicle whereby
GATT contracting parties may remedy disruptive factors to the negotiated bal-
ance of concessions. In this instance, the EC has a direct obligation to such
parties as a result of the General Agreement, in which they are considered to be
producers of the product involved in the concession and exporters of such prod-
uct from within their territory. In other words, the Latin American claimants
have a right in GATT to defend the producing and exporting interests on which
the EC's obligations toward them rest, while the U.S. attempts to defend its
firms' interests under the guise of the Latin American banana producers' legal
rights. Cf. Barcelona Traction, supra note 16, 46-47; see also Warth v. Sel-
din, 422 U.S. at 499 ("even when the plaintiff has alleged injury sufficient to
meet the 'case or controversy' requirement, [the U.S. Supreme Court] has held
that the plaintiff generally must assert his own legal rights and interests, and
cannot rest his claim to relief on the legal rights or interests of third parties.").
199. See supra note 136 and accompanying text.
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the United States should fail to obtain a favorable judgment re-
garding its legal standing before the DSB.
5. The Second Prong of the ICJ Standing Test
Assuming, arguendo, the DSB found that the EC did owe an
obligation toward the United States with respect to its nation-
als, the U.S. claim would likely fail to satisfy the second prong of
the ICJ's Barcelona Traction test. The second prong requires
that only the party to whom an international obligation is due
can bring a claim with respect to its breach. 200 The interests the
United States attempts to protect are both different and the
same as the interests of the other four Latin American countries.
In its brief to the WTO concerning trade in goods, the United
States alleges that both EEC 404193 and the BFA impermissibly
infringe on the GATT Articles I, III, XI, XIII and the WTO Li-
censing Agreement. 201 Further, the United States claims Amer-
ican firms suffered a deleterious decline in their distribution and
marketing levels of third country bananas on which the success
of U.S. firms primarily relied.20 2 Specifically, the United States
complains of the EC's disproportionate issuance of 30% of the
available operator licenses to Category B importers who only
handle EC and/or traditional ACP bananas. The Latin Ameri-
can claimants, on the other hand, simply demand the restora-
tion of the benefits accorded to their banana production and
export industry. Both the United States and the Latin Ameri-
can claimants share the goal of maximizing the permissible level
of exportable bananas to the EC. Although the prayer for relief
the United States advances in its brief to the WTO aims to alle-
viate the concerns of all claimants involved, it does not correlate
with the different obligations that the EC would have assumed
with respect to the banana producing Latin American nations
and the marketing and service oriented United States.
To illustrate, the 1993 and 1994 GATT panels respectively
held the EC banana import regime, and perhaps the BFA, offend
GATT's MFN and national treatment principles.203 The panels
decided in favor of the petitioning Latin American banana pro-
ducers (Colombia, Costa Rica, Guatemala, Nicaragua, and Vene-
zuela) that enjoyed a substantially higher market share of
200. See supra note 168 and accompanying text.
201. See supra Part I.E.1.
202. See supra Part I.E.2.
203. See supra Part I.C.
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banana imports prior to EEC 404193 and the BFA.20 4 Presuma-
bly, this finding will, a fortiori, support a finding of relief for the
current co-claimants Ecuador, Guatemala, Mexico, and Hondu-
ras. Like the 1994 claimants, the current Latin American peti-
tioners have a legitimate claim to defend their export market
shares since they are substantial exporters of bananas and are
currently subject to less favorable treatment than other GATT
third countries. Once the EC restores a level of banana exports
satisfactory to the Latin American countries, however, these
Latin American claimants would have no further interests in a
claim against the EC.20 5 To the contrary, the United States may
feel the interests of the U.S. firms to be ill-served by the Latin
American countries' acquiescence. 206 Thus, the danger for con-
flicting interests emerges with respect to relief.
This reality underscores the risks present in a situation
where a claimant (U.S.) with interests sufficiently separable
from those of its co-claimants prejudice the possibility for clear
analysis of the dispute's merits as well as for an equitable reso-
lution of the matters. In a hypothetical where the EC was found
to owe an obligation to the United States regarding trade in ba-
nanas, the WTO should discern that neither the United States
nor the Latin American countries are the proper advocates for
the interests of the other party. The obligations assumed by a
GATT member are premised on the rights and interests that re-
cipient countries possess. In the current Banana Case, the
United States should not be permitted to maintain legal stand-
ing under the second prong of the ICJ test because the Latin
American countries are the only parties who may bring a claim
for the breach of a specific international obligation premised on
the preservation of their export markets. Thus, they are the
only parties with the right to request relief congruent with the
EC's violations of the obligations due the Latin American claim-
ants under GATT. The United States may, however, have
standing with respect to the breach of a different obligation that
204. Id.
205. This proposition assumes that the Latin American countries ignore any
political pressures from or cultivated loyalties toward the U.S. firms' interests.
206. The reaction the United States demonstrated toward Costa Rica and
Colombia's involvement in the BFA poignantly illustrates the conflict of inter-
ests that permeate this joint-claim. See supra Part I.D-E. If the EC was found
to owe an international obligation to the United States, the DSB should find
such obligation sufficiently different from that owed to the producing Latin
American countries so as to preclude any U.S. involvement in the claim pre-
mised on the obligation owed to the Latin American countries. Of course, this
would not foreclose a separate claim by the U.S. against the EC.
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implicates the direct and specific interests of its domestic firms.
By identifying the separate claims of the United States and the
Latin American complainants, the DSB may fashion calculated
relief that will permit a fairer approximation of the value of the
remedy due based on the GATT violations. Not coincidentally,
this result would once again comport with the primary GATT
notions of "balance of concessions" and "reciprocity."20 7
Despite the uncertain outcome of the U.S.' plight for stand-
ing under the second prong of the ICJ test, the DSB should ad-
judge the issue of U.S. standing in the Banana Case on the basis
of the crucial first prong of the test. In sum, despite the U.S.'
allegations, the EC's GATT violations with respect to trade in
bananas are particular to the rights of banana exporting coun-
tries, and only incidentally affect U.S. firms' interests. As previ-
ously noted in Barcelona Traction, an interest does not
automatically translate into a right,20 and the manner in which
a host state protects both foreign interests and rights turns
largely on the obligation it owes the foreign state and its nation-
als.20 9 Based on the foregoing distinction between the obliga-
tions the EC owes the Latin American third countries and the
adversely, but incidentally, affected interests of the U.S. firms,
GATT's international tribunal should not permit the U.S. gov-
ernment to assert diplomatic protection over the U.S. firms.210
Thus, under the Barcelona Traction doctrine of standing, the
207. See supra notes 113-14 and accompanying text.
208. Barcelona Traction, supra note 16, 46 ("[Spain argued] the measures
complained of, although taken with respect to Barcelona Traction and causing
it damage, constituted an unlawful act vis-a-vis Belgium, because they also,
though indirectly, caused damage to the Belgian shareholders in Barcelona
Traction. [The Court perceived Spain's argument as] merely a different way of
presenting the distinction between injury in respect of a right and injury to a
simple interest.... [Elvidence that damage was suffered does not ipso facto
justify a diplomatic claim.... This in itself does not involve the obligation to
make reparation."); see also supra note 198 and accompanying text.
209. See supra Part IV.B.3-5.
210. See Barcelona Traction, supra note 16, 87 ("When a State admits into
its territory foreign investments or foreign nationals it is bound to extend to
them the protection of the law. However, it does not thereby become an insurer
of that part of another State's wealth which these investments represent.
Every investment of this kind carries certain risks. The real question is
whether a right has been violated, which right could only be the right of the
State to have its nationals enjoy a certain treatment guaranteed by general
international law, in the absence of a treaty applicable to the particular case.").
Likewise, GATT fails to insure the risks U.S. firms took in relying on the obliga-
tions the EC assumed with respect to all substantial banana-producing nations
that export from within their territory. See supra notes 149-54 and accompany-
ing text.
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DSB would deem the United States an inappropriate party to
bring the current claim under GA'T in terms of trade in goods.
V. PRINCIPLES THAT SHOULD GUIDE A GATT
DOCTRINE OF STANDING
Until now, the absence of a principled GATT doctrine of
standing has not notably prejudiced the administration of GATT
dispute settlement. The Banana Case, however, illuminates
the difficulty GATT panels may encounter without the benefit of
concrete guidelines to help determine whether claimants have
the appropriate stake in the controversy to adjudicate their
claims before the GATT. An operational GATT standing doc-
trine must develop in accordance with the demands that GATT's
political and economic environment places on both contracting
parties and the WTO dispute settlement body.
In light of the prevalent legalistic nature of the DSB, the
WTO should fashion devices that will enable it to administer its
dispute settlement duties consistent with its modified philoso-
phy.211 Assuming that the DSB's primary mission is to promote
compliance with GATT rules by contracting parties, 212 a doc-
trine of locus standi furthers this goal by allowing only those
parties with claims grounded in the breach of specific obligations
to seek redress before the panel. The DSB, by excluding inap-
propriate claimants, accomplishes two objectives: (1) it is able to
fashion relief in accordance with Article XXIII that is equivalent
to the injury caused by the offending party, and (2) to pre-empt
the significant presence of any additional political or economic
influences that come before the panel by denying standing to
those parties who improperly represent the rights of other con-
tracting parties.218
With respect to the first objective to formulate adequate re-
lief, the DSB may rely on both Article XXIII and the DSU to
grant an injured party leave to either receive compensation from
211. See supra Part H.B. Like the U.S. standing doctrine, a GATT standing
doctrine would not operate in a vacuum and thus may require the development
of prudential considerations. If GATT does not speak directly to standing of a
particular class of parties, the DSB will have to resort to such prudential con-
siderations to limit its role in resolving disputes that fall outside assumed obli-
gations. See Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 499-501 (delineating some prudential
limitations the Court applies); see also supra note 133 and accompanying text.
212. See supra note 107 and accompanying text; see also PESCATORE, supra
note 101, at 76 ("Clearly the goal of the dispute settlement system should be to
promote compliance with GATT rules.").
213. PESCATORE, supra note 101, at 75-76; see supra Part fl.B.
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the offending party or suspend concessions afforded to the of-
fending party so as to restore the negotiated "balance of conces-
sions."214 The process of formulating remedies to negate the
effect of injuries on the balance of concessions is inherently im-
perfect because a myriad of factors may contribute to an alleged
injury.215 The DSB, however, ought to scrupulously search for a
remedy that will afford the injured party equitable compensa-
tion for its anticipated benefits from the accorded concessions, or
the tools with which to restore its particular balance of conces-
sions by withdrawing equivalent concessions.
In the Banana Case, the DSB unnecessarily faces the U.S.
petition for relief, which may cause the collective prayer for re-
lief to exceed the level of relief warranted by the injury.216 The
DSB, by hearing an improper claimant, is faced with the possi-
bility of overcompensating for the injury. To grant relief ade-
quate to address a bona fide claim against a GATT violation or
"imbalance," panels must evaluate the relationship between the
alleged injury and the requested relief. Currently, the Panel in
the Banana Case confronts a tenuous relationship between the
injury the United States alleges its firms suffered and its prayer
for relief. In the event the Panel were to find, as its predecessors
did in 1993 and 1994, that the EC breached its obligations under
GATT toward the Latin American third countries, what further
legitimate relief could the U.S. firms enjoy other than the deriv-
ative relief that the Latin American countries would receive?217
Any relief directed at the United States in addition to this deriv-
ative relief would amount to overcompensation, thereby prevent-
ing the DSB from repairing the existing imbalance to the
negotiated schedule of concessions. If the Latin American third
countries can restore the balance of concessions by asserting the
claim on behalf of their interested operators as substantial ex-
porters/importers of the product in question, then the U.S. pres-
ence is not only superfluous, but also prejudicial to fair
administration of dispute resolution in an international tribu-
214. PESCATORE, supra note 101, at 75; see DSU, supra note 14, art. 22, at
422 ("Compensation and the suspension of concessions or other obligations are
temporary measures available... ").
215. Cf JACKSON, supra note 20, at 390-91 (describing the well-known
"Chicken War" dispute between the United States and the EU concerning per-
missible magnitude of concession withdrawals allowed to the U.S. in response
to the Eli's violation of its GATT binding on poultry).
216. See supra Part IV.B.5.
217. See supra note 203 and accompanying text.
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nal.218 The WTO, however, may minimize the degree of such
risk through the doctrine of standing. With such a tool, the
DSB would be better equipped to fashion a remedy that will re-
establish the lost equilibrium of concessions based on the degree
of injury sustained from the GATT violation. To achieve this,
however, the WTO must first ensure that parties without an ad-
equate stake or interest in the dispute are precluded from re-
questing relief additional to that which proper claimants
requested.
Yet, opponents of a GATT doctrine of standing may posit
that no such risk of overcompensation exists when the relief
joint-claimants request, whether proper parties to the dispute or
not, is equal. Although such an argument may reach a level of
theoretical persuasion, the climate in which GATT and the WTO
operate impedes it from gaining practical acceptance. Architects
of a GATT standing doctrine should observe not only the manner
in which panels fashion relief, but also the influence and re-
sources that parties have in advancing claims before a tribunal.
Since the DSB, like other tribunals, generally limits its opinions
in panel reports to arguments that disputants raise, without sua
sponte asserting any unstated arguments, the WTO should not
permit more resourceful parties to craft a litigation strategy for
less developed countries. 219 Such a result would "poison the en-
vironment" in which GATT operates by producing a constant
struggle among smaller countries to ally themselves with larger,
richer joint-claimants. Although larger countries are unlikely to
involve themselves in costly litigation without having interests
at stake, their involvement in the dispute ought to withstand
the standing test so as to ensure that their rights, and not just
218. Critics of the United States' involvement in the banana controversy
could analogize its participation as being a hired gun of legal advocacy equipped
with more ample resources and political muscle than its co-claimants. Accord-
ingly, the ability for a nation without the proper stake in the controversy to
bring a claim on behalf of others could be perceived as offensive to the integrity
of the international legal system. This might suggest that the EC, the United
States and the more influential international trade figures could act as "hired
guns" in claims that do not directly implicate their rights, but may incidentally
affect their nationals' interests. Cf Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106, 114 (1976)
(emphasizing that the court depends on effective advocacy and that third par-
ties are usually the best proponents of their own rights). Conversely, the
United States could be perceived as a "bully" imposing its interests upon the
rights of other countries seeking relief under GATT.
219. Cf. 1994 Panel Report, supra note 7, at 177 (an example of a typical
GATT panel report which structures its legal analysis of every disputed issue
based on the specific allegations stated in the respective parties' briefs and
arguments).
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their interests, were violated by the alleged offender.220 At the
same time, major international trade nations should be prohib-
ited from pursuing or advocating the claims corresponding to the
rights of smaller countries in order to serve their own self-
interests. 221
In the Banana Case, U.S. lack of standing would not, how-
ever, deny its voice in a formal GATT proceeding. Article 10 of
the GATT's "Dispute Settlement Understanding" provides meas-
ures whereby third parties to disputes may argue their alleged
stake or interests in the matter.222 They may do so by present-
ing their arguments at a panel hearing of all interested non-
claimants and submitting a written brief.223 For example, St.
Lucia, Dominica, St. Vincent, and several other East Caribbean
states who individually maintain substantial interests in the
resolution of the banana dispute, but were prevented from join-
ing the claim, used the DSU as a means of recourse.224 Through
Article 10 of the DSU, the DSB granted these countries the op-
portunity to present briefs to argue their positions. 225 In this
case, the United States' involvement should more properly as-
sume this role of third party intervenor because it possesses no
legal standing to advocate a position on behalf of the Latin
American complainants, despite its interest in the matter. Such
third countries are capable of defending their own rights ac-
crued under the obligations assumed by the EC regarding trade
220. See supra text accompanying note 198.
221. See Robert E. Hudec, et al.,A Statistical Profile of GATT Dispute Settle-
ment Cases: 1948-1989, 2 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 1, 56-59 (1993). In their sta-
tistical analysis of GA'Tr dispute settlement cases, the authors adduced
evidence that a stronger or more influential GATT country has a higher rate of
violation findings when it asserts a claim before the GATT. Furthermore, the
United States alone obtained the lowest percentage of negative outcomes even
into the late 1980s. Id. at 59. The Article suggests that such a consistent result
in favor of the United States as a complainant is attributable to its whole-
hearted investment of resources into the complaint. Id. at 59.
222. See DSU, supra note 14, art. 10, at 413 ("Any Member. having a sub-
stantial interest in a matter before a panel ... shall have an opportunity to be
heard by the panel and to make written submissions to the panel.').
223. Id.
224. See Agriculture: WTO Dispute Panel Begins Hearing on EU Banana Re-
gime Complaint by US, supra note 76, at 1423 (providing a parallel situation of
disgruntled Caribbean parties that, despite their substantial interests in the
matter, failed to participate as parties in the Banana Case).
225. See id. (stating the manner in which the Caribbean states interested in
the banana dispute have been ordered to present their positions rather summa-
rily, and thus forced to rely on the EC to argue their plea vociferously).
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in bananas, and thus stand in a favorable position to obtain eq-
uitable relief.226
A GATT doctrine of locus standi yields beneficial results to
the WTO's dispute settlement administration. For instance, it
would mitigate tendencies of larger and more dominant GATT
countries, with interests rather than rights at stake, to partici-
pate in the dispute settlement process as litigation consultants
to smaller co-claimants that have a right to assert their claims.
GATT cannot afford to allow the courting of major trade players
in dispute settlement to serve as a decisive factor in dispute res-
olution. Equally important, larger and more influential coun-
tries cannot be allowed to exert pressure on smaller countries
demanding they seek uncompromising relief that will not only
satisfy the smaller countries' legal and economic interests, but
also those of the larger country. In response to these objectiona-
ble tendencies, Article 10 of the DSU allows third parties, irre-
spective of their influence, to participate in the dispute
settlement process so long as they have a "substantial interest
in [the] matter before a panel."22 7 By filtering parties whose
rights were violated from parties who have only an interest in
the outcome of a dispute, the DSB preserves the integrity of the
system enabling panels to focus on addressing the issues that
the proper disputants raise and more importantly on recom-
mending equitable relief that restores the dislocated balance of
concessions.
CONCLUSION
The Banana Case illustrates a direct violation of a GATT
party's obligations toward other GATT members. The EC's pro-
mulgation of EEC 404/93, which created the banana import re-
gime, and the establishment of the Framework Agreement on
Bananas undeniably impaired the benefits that the Latin Amer-
ican third countries rightfully anticipated to accrue from the
GATT. The United States, under a hybrid of both the American
and the ICJ doctrines of standing, would not prevail as a claim-
ant in the subject dispute. Although established international
226. The importance of the application of a standing doctrine rises when
considering the possible strain on settlement prospects that the U.S. involve-
ment harbors in the Banana Case. Similar to the BFA countries' acquiescence
to the EC's proposal for country-specific quota allocations, the current Latin
American claimants of Ecuador, Honduras, Guatemala, and Mexico could
foreseeably desire to settle short of the demands the U.S. interests dictate. See
supra Part W.B.5.
227. See DSU, supra note 14, art. 10, at 413.
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and national locus standi principles do not directly govern the
operations of GATT dispute settlement, the mechanisms that
such adjudicatory entities use to determine a party's proper
stake in the dispute are appropriate for and amenable to the
DSB's functions.
Such a doctrine would allow the DSB to fulfill its primary
objective of crafting relief that would restore the balance of con-
cessions that the alleged injury altered. Additionally, the proper
claimants to the dispute may better serve their own interests by
asserting their positions without the undue influence of an im-
proper claimant. Nonetheless, denying the United States legal
standing would not impede its right to voice its position through
a third party intervention. The twin objectives of a GATT stand-
ing doctrine are necessary to the effective and fair administra-
tion of dispute settlement in a multilateral international forum
that has assumed an adjudicatory complexion. To avoid compro-
mising the achievement of such objectives, the WTO should
make the formulation of a standing doctrine a priority. The in-
clusion of the United States as an improper party in the Banana
Case gives rise to speculations as to the role it has played in
such resolution, and inevitably will create an aura of distrust in
an already inherently distrustful environment.
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